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ABSTRACT
PAYING TO STAY: EFFECTS OF VERTICAL INTEGRATION AND COMPETITION
IN A POST-ACUTE CARE SETTING
Vicki Y. Chen
Guy David
I investigate how competition and vertical integration affect a firm’s customer acquisition versus retention strategies in the context of home health agencies. Under Medicare,
these agencies are paid a lump-sum payment for each new or current patient’s home health
episode, lasting up to 60 days. I focus on the agency’s strategic choice to retain, or recertify,
patients for an additional episode when under changing competitive dynamics or under vertical integration with a hospital. Using data on Medicare beneficiaries who transition from
an acute stay to post-acute care from 2007 to 2013, I show that non-vertically integrated
agencies facing increasing competition for new patients under this payment system recertify
more patients in order to compensate for diminishing quantity (and profits). In contrast,
vertically integrated agencies are insulated from these competitive pressures and have fewer
recertifications by 3.43 percentage points on average without increases in readmissions. To
control for patient selection and provider-level selection bias into vertical arrangements, I use
a combination of instrumental variables approach and fixed effects at the hospital-agency
pair level over time. I also construct a Herfindahl–Hirschman index using a conditional
logit model based on relatively exogenous travel distances. The results indicate that, in
this setting, vertical integration can reduce Medicare spending on post-acute care episodes
through referral control without adverse effects on readmissions by 5.8-7.5%. Competition
for new patients among non-integrated agencies may exacerbate the unnecessary retention
of current patients, resulting in 4-5.5% increase in HHA spending.
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CHAPTER 1 : Introduction
1.1. Introduction
Firms in many different industries often must determine how much to invest in attracting
new customers versus in deepening the relationships with the customers they currently
have. Both of these investments have costs associated with them, which may also depend
on conditions in the market or in the firm. In this paper, I focus on two conditions—
competition and vertical integration—in the context of home health agencies (HHAs) due
to their unique payment structure under Medicare that features unlimited recertifications.
In particular, I examine how competition and vertical integration affect the agency’s strategic decision to recertify patients. Both may serve as mechanisms to disrupt the extensive,
or new patient, margin. On the one hand, while competitive markets should theoretically
tend towards efficient allocations, regulations and imperfect markets can create perverse
incentives—here, excessive recertification—that may worsen as competition for patients increases and the flow of new patients becomes more restrictive or costly to obtain. On the
other hand, vertical integration with a hospital provides the agency a guaranteed flow of
patients through referral control, which makes finding new patients very easy. This lessens
the incentive to generate demand through retention. Hospitals prefer to pass on patients
requiring general recovery tasks earlier to HHAs (David et al. 2013). This allocation of tasks
is more efficient, increases profits for the hospital, and orients HHAs to both expect and prepare for new patients sooner. However, this may also lead to overly quick patient turnover
by agencies and worse outcomes for patients. Thus, I also examine the resulting impact
of reducing or increasing recertifications on Medicare spending and on patient outcomes,
namely readmissions. If the recertifications do not affect outcomes but cost Medicare more
money, then the tendency to recertify is highly suggestive of low-value care for a portion of
patients.
The customer acquisition versus retention trade-off is relevant to many industries, but
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studying post-acute care and Medicare is important in their own right. The Medicare
program in the United States served 57 million people over the age of 65 and spent $632
billion in 2015 (Cubanski and Neuman 2016). Post-acute care (PAC), of which home health
agencies are almost 40%, is a small portion of that spending but still accounts for $60
billion. It is a significant source of geographic variation in Medicare spending (Newhouse
and Garber 2013) and was the fastest growing major spending category of Medicare through
the 2000’s (Chandra et al. 2013). An estimated third of Medicare spending is wasted
on unnecessary or low-value care; three major categories contributing to this waste are
overtreatment, pricing failure, and failure in care coordination (Berwick and Hackbarth
2012). Understanding spending patterns and care patterns in post-acute care has important
implications for Medicare overall.
Attempts at remedies have included both market-oriented strategies such as increasing
competition, and regulatory strategies, such as regulated prices, prospective payment systems, or bundling payment under accountable care organizations (ACOs) that encourage
vertically-related entities to coordinate care. Two important relevant questions are whether
there are efficiency gains from increasing competition or from integration, or does this lead
to other behaviors such as gaming or foreclosure on rivals. In this paper, I study how
provider incentives in the PAC payment structure affect their investment on retention, as
measured through length of care provision, and specifically how competition and vertical
integration may improve or exacerbate these effects. This work can shed light on unintended
consequences of competition in regulated markets and implications of care coordination for
future payment structures emphasizing coordination, such as bundled payments or ACOs.
My analysis focuses on patients discharged following an acute-care hospital stay to HHAs.
Medicare payments for HHAs differ from the prospective payment system for other providers.
HHAs are paid in 60-day episodes, adjusted for diagnosis or case-mix, with unlimited continuous recertification for additional episodes. Unlike hospital prospective payment, which
provides payment for a single episode, or skilled nursing facilities (SNFs) payment, which is

2

on a per-diem basis and limited to 100 days, this continuous recertification feature of HHAs
creates an incentive to strategically create demand through retention.
Under Medicare’s payment scheme for HHAs, the agencies can influence quantity through
two margins— number of new patients and number of recertified patients. Due to the
presence of “repeatable” customers, HHAs face a classic business problem of how much to
invest in marketing to new customers relative to retaining customers. This is a question
rooted in the marketing literature (Blattberg and Deighton 1996, Reinartz et al. 2005,
Berger and Bechwati 2001). In this context, because the setting is simplified with fixed
prices and the reduced role that customer demand plays1 , the firm’s strategy of trading
off new versus retained customers can be seen in the data without knowing the actual
investment made or costs of the firm.
In this paper, I formulate a simple model that shows how the rate of recertification increases
under increasing competition and how vertical integration can reduce the rate of patient
retention regardless of severity. Structuring the firm’s profit function to have separate acquisition and retention convex costs, I show that when one cost becomes more or less costly,
the firm substitutes for quantity on the relatively cheaper margin. It is theoretically ambiguous whether this leads to under-provision or appropriate provision of care. I empirically
test implications from the model using claims data spanning the years 2007-2013. These
claims are the universe of Medicare Part A claims data linked with Medicare HHA data at
the individual level; I only examine patients discharged to HHAs following an acute-care
stay.
There are three major endogeneity challenges: bias in patient selection, unobservable differences in vertically integrated entities compared to the non-integrated at the provider-level,
and endogeneity of market structure when measuring competition. I look at each of the
biases separately. I overcome the bias to patient selection using an instrumental variables ap1

Patients face no out-of-pocket costs and no travel costs, and generally therapy and aide assistance, while
having diminishing positive marginal returns, are thought to provide positive marginal returns nonetheless.
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proach; my instrument of choice is the differential distance from nearest vertically-integrated
hospital and the nearest non-integrated hospital. This commonly used instrument (Rahman
et al. 2016b; Chandra and Staiger 2007; McClellan et al. 1994) works because patients have
a non-zero travel cost to seeking care, making distance a significant predictor of attending
a vertically integrated hospital, which in turn is a significant predictor of attending the
integrated agency. On the other hand, the differential distance is likely to be independent
of patient severity biases.
To address the second endogeneity concern—provider-level selection bias—I then take advantage of the individual, detailed, longitudinal medical claims data from Medicare and
post-acute care claims to examine the impact of provider-level endogeneity on the results. I
use fixed effects at the hospital and hospital-agency pair level to remove any time-invariant
omitted variable biases, such as quality. Few papers use such a long timespan to examine post-acute care impacts (Konetzka et al. (2016) being one such exception). Finally,
to address market structure, I utilize the zipcode-level detail of my dataset to construct
an exogenous measure of home health agency concentration, a variant of the Herfindahl–
Hirschman Index (HHI), using predicted patient flows estimated from a conditional logit
model based on relative distances between hospitals and agencies and their characteristics.
Using predicted patient flows should reduce the biases in the definition and measurement
of market structure.
I find that vertical integration reduces the rate of recertification by 3.39-3.96 percentage
points (21.7-25.4%), and this effect persists through many specifications and robustness
checks. Recertification rate increases as agency competition increases, in particular for
non-integrated entities (0.78-2.14 percentage points for a 1 standard deviation decrease in
HHI concentration, or 5.1- 13.9%). I find that the competition effects are driven by the
non-vertically integrated entities, and vertically integrated agencies appear to be insulated
from competitive effects. That is, agency concentration and vertical integration serve as
substitutes in this regard. Vertical integration and higher HHI concentrations are associated
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with significant Medicare savings at the HHA level ranging from 4.1-6.8% of average HHA
costs. There is no difference in the readmission rates, which suggests that Medicare may be
able to save costs with fewer recertifications without negative outcomes for patients.
This paper relates to several strands of literature. First, it relates to the literature on
provider response to payment incentives, particularly under competition. It is well-established
that providers respond with greater quantity under volume-enhancing payments such as feefor-service (FFS) (Robinson and Luft 1985), and providers adjust quantity in response to
discontinuous or prospective payment structures (Ellis and McGuire 1996, Cutler 1995,
Einav et al. 2017). Particularly when facing competition, providers increase quantity, often
proxied by spending, under FFS (Held and Pauly 1983, Ellis 1998, Meltzer et al. 2002).
More recent papers focus on PPS and competition’s impact on quality (Kessler and McClellan 2000, Kessler and Geppert 2005, Gowrisankaran and Town 2003), which plays a
significantly lesser role in attracting hospital referrals in this context and time period.
This paper also relates to the growing literature of vertical integration, which is generally separated into two strands—efficiency gains or anti-competitive effects through referral
control. Much of the post-acute care literature on vertical integration focus on coordinative benefits measured by outcomes and expenditures (Rahman et al. 2016b,Rahman et al.
2013, Konetzka et al. 2016). Additionally, few papers bridge the gap between market-wide
patterns and firm level impacts. Those that do focus on different contexts highlight referral control effects; Nakamura (2010) examines referral patterns in the opposite direction,
from physician practices to hospitals, and Hastings and Gilbert (2005) consider gasoline
distribution where prices are not regulated.
This paper applies this concept to a new setting with highly detailed, longitudinal data and
considers a unique outcome variable within this setting. As far as I am aware, this is the
first paper to consider the length of stay in a PAC as a strategic profit-maximizing decision
and the first paper to consider home health recertifications as an outcome. Additionally,
few papers consider how referral control may actually lead to efficiency gains. The results
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from this paper have implications for prospective payment policy, for policies considering
vertical organization amongst health care providers, and anti-trust policies considering the
merits and dangers of increasing concentration.
Furthermore, this paper is applicable to industries outside of health care as well. The
incentive issues faced here are similar to other industries with a pay-per-unit structure where
there is asymmetric information and the payer does not know how long a project should take.
Examples of this include lawyers or contractors, who have hourly charges but must decide on
whether or not they should spend more hours on this or another project. Literature in this
area have shown that hourly wage contracts have more hours than contingent fee contracts
(Schwartz and Mitchell 1970, Danzon 1983), and with excess capacity, a lawyer under an
hourly wage contract will spend more hours when s/he has insufficient number of cases
than when s/he does not (Emons 2000). These, as is my paper, are distinct from principalagent moral hazard cases as those require the principal to know the value of the project
but cannot observe effort. Here, the optimal effort is not known. This work also relates to
marketing literature studying investment in acquisition versus retention of customers. A
distinct difference between my setting and other settings is the ability to lower price or offer
kickbacks when facing greater competition; as this is not an option for HHA’s, they must
find a different means of increasing quantity.
This paper is structure as follows. Section 2 dives deeper into the past literature and explains
my contribution to the literature. Section 3 of this chapter describes the home health care
setting and payment structure. I wrap up the introductory chapter with a simple theoretical
model to motivate the hypotheses for both vertical integration and competition contexts.
Chapter 2 is entitled Data and Empirical Framework. Here I describe the data and sample,
describing from where the data come, how the final dataset was formulated, and summary
statistics tables that show details about the sample used. I also cover my empirical strategy
for removing biases for both vertical integration and competition, and I discuss other checks
and specifications I run. The results are shown in Chapter 3. First, I present graphical
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trends from the raw data. Then I show results from regression analyses on the effect of
vertical integration on recertifications, spending, outcomes, and other robustness checks.
In the next subsection, I show results on the effect of competition on the same dependent
variables. Finally I describe additional work on mechanism using event studies and Medicare
Advantage influence on competition and on the marginal recertified patient compared to the
average. I conclude in Chapter 4 with a discussion including policy implications, limitations,
and conclusions.

1.2. Previous Literature
This paper contributes to many strands of literature. In this section I describe past works
in each strand more fully and discuss the contributions of this paper. Broadly speaking,
the study of customer-retention versus acquisition tradeoff is rooted in marketing literature.
Yet our healthcare context make some of the assumptions typically seen in those models
a bit different. In the healthcare space, the paper is closely tied to literature on general
provider response to payment structures in health care and in particular, those relating
to fee-for-service payments and other volume-enhancing payments. Within this group of
literature, more work has evolved to include the effect of competition among providers under
these payment structures on volume, prices, and quality in health care. However, the work
on price changes under competition is less relevant in this context of fixed prices.
More narrowly, there has been an increasing body of literature focusing on effects of growing
competition in post-acute care settings as well. This paper also contributes to the literature
on vertical integration, which typically is split between focus on efficiency gains or on
potential anticompetitive behavior such as rival foreclosure, and adds to the less-researched
literature of firm organization within post-acute care. Few papers have considered the
interactive effects of firm structure and market structure. This paper also contributes to
the literature of low value care in health care spending. Finally, the model presented in
this paper is similar to those relating to hourly wage contracts for lawyers. This paper
examines an understudied setting—home health agencies— and uses a never-studied-before
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outcome—recertifications—to consider impacts of vertical and horizontal structure as well
as the interdependencies between the two.
The concept that firms must trade off investing in customer retention or in customer acquisition has been studied in marketing. These papers generally model industries with
frequent repeat buyers and assume a customer lifetime profitability over which firms maximize (Berger and Bechwati 2001, Reinartz et al. 2005). The margins of the investments
will depend on many factors; while the models focus on types of marketing and their relative returns, customer characteristics such as loyalty also matter. Voss and Voss (2008) and
Min et al. (2016) ask how customer retention and acquisition spending patterns differ under
competing market dynamics. Both papers show through models that acquisition costs will
increase and retention costs will increase. This is because as competition increases, customer
loyalty decreases leading to less returns for each marginal investment in current customers
over their lifetime whereas greater investment in innovation can attract customers.
This assumption driving retention costs differs significantly from the HHA context however.
First, agencies are not maximizing over a patient’s lifetime— their decision margin is only
on the marginal episode. Additionally, agencies heavily appeal to hospitals for patients,
who tend not to switch providers frequently. Several papers have shown that customers in
health care are much stickier than in other industries with regards to provider selection as
there are greater sunk costs in high contact services (Patterson and Smith 2003). Patients
tend to only switch providers when dissatisfied with their care (Coulter 2010) and there is
high customer loyalty in medical services (Andreasen 1983).
This paper is closely linked to the fee-for-service literature, which is unsurprising considering
the HHA recertification structure has a per-unit reimbursement feature. As such, much of
this work is from the 1980s and 90s and considers provider behavior changes with respect to
prospective payment systems. Fee-for-service payments have been shown theoretically and
empirically to lead to greater quantities of services provided as compared to prospective or
bundled payments (Ellis and McGuire, 1990). In addition, McGuire (2000) demonstrates
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theoretically that a decline in fees or an increase in competition can lead to increased
quantity of care. A large set of literature focuses on changes in payment structure or fees
and examines the resulting impact on provider behavior.
It is clear that greater financial pressures, due to changing margins to providers, alters the
type and quantity of care provided. Ellis and McGuire (1996) demonstrates theoretically
that hospitals respond to payment changes under prospective payment in three main ways:
a) moral hazard, or a change in the treatment patterns the provider engages in, b) selection,
or a change in the type of patients the provider choose to treat, or c) practice style, or a
change in market shares across facilities. Empirical evidence shows indeed that providers
may change their treatment patterns, increasing higher margin treatments and decreasing
low margin treatments ((Jacobson et al., 2013)). They may cherrypick patients, or they
may actually upcode patients to increase margins without evidence of changes on in volume
or intensity of treatments ((Dafny, 2005)).
I hypothesize in this paper that increased pressure on provider margins will lead to increases
in quantity that is paid per unit. This is not a new concept as many papers have shown that
under fee-for-service payment, volume increases in response to declining prices or increased
pressures on provider margins. Christensen (1992) uses Medicare claims from 1976 to 1978
and they find that following a substantial Medicare fee change, providers engaged in “volume
offset”, replacing 50% of losses from fee changes with increased volume. Nguyen and Derrick
(1997) finds physicians that did not face significant fee decreases did not change behavior,
but those that did recouped approximately 40 cents for every dollar cut through volume
increases. There is also evidence of greater quantity of care increase under competition in
a fee-for-service model (Robinson and Luft 1985, Meltzer et al. 2002).
Volume offsets tie closely to the extensive demand-inducement literature, which describes
undue provider influence on treatment in response to a decrease in income or profits. This
work was pioneered by Fuchs (1978) and later shown that decreases in prices may lead to
increases in quantity of care provided if income effects are larger than substitution effects
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(McGuire and Pauly, 1991). The theoretical models used are physician utility models, which
incorporate utility for income, leisure, and patient benefit from providing care. Empirically,
there has been evidence of decreasing profit margins or prices leading to increases in quantity
of care when substitution effects do not dominate income effects (Gruber and Owings 1996).
When they do, theres evidence that quantity of care does not increase even when prices fall
(Gruber et al. 1999a).
Work in post-acute care shows that PAC providers respond to payment changes as well;
however, the easier entry and exit of PACs as compared to hospitals shows that PACs tend
to exit more often in response to payment decreases (Huckfeldt et al. 2013). The change
towards PPS for PAC providers also differs in important ways from hospital PPS. For
example, skilled nursing facilities began to be paid per diem with rate changes with respect
to therapy intensity and type. Following a decrease in per diems but an increase in therapy
rates, Grabowski et al. (2011) found that the number of Medicare residents decreased but
services and therapy increased per day without any changes in length of stay. Comparing
differential payment changes across the spectrum of PAC providers (home health agencies,
skilled nursing facilities, and inpatient rehabilitation facilities), Buntin et al. (2009) found
patients were distributed differently across facilities in response but there were no changes
on overall patient outcomes and there were no changes to the severely ill patients access
despite case mix weights that may have skewed them towards home health agencies, the
least intense of the PACs compared.
This paper doesn’t use fee changes as the exogenous change– instead, it uses changes in
competition or in firm organization to examine impacts on quantity (as measured by recertifications). Papers in the inducement literature have disagreed on the effects of competition
on inducement. Competition may have a limiting effect as patients may switch providers
more easily due to diminishing to negative marginal benefits as care increases (McGuire
2000), or it may be ambiguous as increasing competition causes diminishing margins which
may lead to more care provided (Dranove 1988). Ellis and McGuire (1986) suggests the
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impact of competition on quantity during prospective payment is ambiguous; some say
competition may prevent underprovision of care but it may also lead to greater provision
of care to high margin patients.
Clearly there is a significant amount of work on physician behavior under payment changes
or fee changes; however, there is a lack of empirical work considering the impacts on quantity
of care under changes in competition or on the effects on changes in retention investment.
This paper makes this contribution, providing a simple profit-maximizing (as opposed to a
physician utility model) that explains increases in quantity under increasing competition.
A huge part of the health care literature focuses on competition effects on quality, costs,
and amenities. Unlike free-market industries that can use pricing as a tool in response to
competition, Medicare is a market where medical prices are regulated. Theoretical models
in price-regulated markets demonstrate that firms compete on non-price dimensions instead. Generally, this is assumed to be along the quality dimension because of prospective
payment’s downward pressure on quantity of services. It may also encompass improved
amenities (as modeled in Held and Pauly (1983) for example). Providers may also substitute for diminishing profits through increased quantity of care under fee for service models,
as shown in the literature described above on physician agency and inducement. For firms
maximizing profits along the quality dimension, theory predicts that with greater competition, firms increase quality in order to increase their quantity demand. The degree to which
a firm invests in quality depends on the elasticity of overall demand and the firm’s share
with respect to quality (Gaynor 2006). The explicit assumption is that the elasticity of
the firm’s share is greater when there are more firms. Whether this competition is (social)
welfare enhancing or welfare detracting is ambiguous.
Empirically, there has been some evidence suggesting that competition leads to better outcomes for patients. Most papers use heart attack or acute myocardial infarction (AMI)
patients as death is a common outcome and a reliable quality metric. Gaynor et al. (2013)
uses an exogenous policy change in the National Health Service in the United Kingdom that
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promoted competition in local markets. Their difference-in-difference approach showed that
a 10% increase in concentration led to a 2.91% increase in AMI mortality. There was no
effect on total admissions, elective admissions or expenditures. However, the evidence is
not always straightforward. Kessler and Geppert (2005) found that only high risk heart
attack patients had significantly better outcomes in more competitive markets. Kessler and
McClellan (2000) found that only after 1990 was competition unambiguously better for outcomes and expenditures; the authors suggest that managed care played a role in the change
but could not explain specifically why 1990. Shen (2003) similarly found that more hospitals
decrease mortality after 1990. On the other hand, Gowrisankaran and Town (2003) found
that competition improved AMI mortality for HMO patients with private insurance but
found the opposite effect for Medicare patients. Older papers focusing on FFS structures
have also found that competition increases costs (Robinson and Luft 1985, Held and Pauly
1983), and that following the change towards PPS, hospitals decreased costs for the most
severely ill patients in areas of greater competition (Meltzer et al. 2002).
Most of the literature on competition under regulated payment is focused at the hospital
level; very few papers consider post-acute care competition and even fewer look at home
health care. Notably, Polsky et al. (2014) take advantage of certificate of need (CON) laws,
which impact the home health competition level, to compare the effects of competition in the
home health industry. They find that in the non-CON states, there are fewer readmissions in
the first 60 days post-discharge but this does not persist after 60 days. There is no difference
in outcomes over all discharges and no significant difference in expenditures. Similarly using
certificate of need laws, Rahman et al. (2016a) find that the number of home health agencies
grew more rapidly in states with than without CON laws but found that there was faster
expenditure growth as well. On the contrary, they found there were fewer skilled nursing
facilities and slower spending over time in states without CON laws.
Jung and Polsky (2014) estimates home health quality on competition using six years of
panel data in the 2000s. They hypothesize that information about home health quality
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may be particularly bad compared to other provider settings, and if patients have difficulty
assessing quality, providers have little incentive to invest in quality in order to compete
(Akerlof 1970). Similar to this paper, these authors construct a measure of competition
through conditional logit following Kessler and McClellan (2000). They find that there is
generally increasing quality as competition increases but not for the most competitive areas
where there is more exit and worse quality.
Among the few post-acute care papers considering competition effects, none of them examine the effect of competition on the effect on length of stay or number of episodes in
PAC facilities. Rather they are limited to expenditures and readmissions. Furthermore,
few other provider settings allow for continuous recertification for new payment episodes
or payment schedules featuring non-linear jumps for providing the same service. The exception may be long-term care hospitals, which received a payment jump after a certain
number of days of care, such as (Einav et al., 2017). However, their paper considers provider
discharge behavior (specifically, time to discharge) in response to the payment bump from
FFS to PPS and the mortality effects based on direction of patient flow. This differs from
the scenario here as a very high percentage of patients in home health make it past the low
payment adjustment of four visits into PPS.
This paper also relates to literature on vertical integration, which can be separated into
two strands of study: organizational economics which emphasizes efficiency gains through
coordinative benefits and industrial organization which emphasizes potentially harmful anticompetitive effects generally through referral control or efficiency gains via marginal cost
improvements. Organizational economics generally characterizes integration as the efficient
result of contracting frictions and transaction costs. When these frictions between the two
firms are costlier than the barrier cost of integration and unsolvable by written contract,
they will prefer to integrate (Williamson, 1971). Vertical integration is often characterized as single firm ownership of residual rights (Grossman and Hart 1986); that is, one
firm holds the rights to make decisions on non-contractible issues, which may maximize a
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different function than the profit function as single firms. On the other hand, industrial
organization (IO) examines integration at the market or industry level, often focusing on
strategic reasons for integrating and economies of scale or scope as benefits. Specifically,
traditional IO theory postulates that vertical integration could be welfare decreasing because it can restrict supply, foreclose on downstream rivals or generate more rents from
downstream firms.
Many other industries have been studied empirically under both fields. Using the airline industry, Forbes and Lederman (2009, 2010) shown vertical integration leads to performance
gains; using data from the airline industry, the authors find that large national airlines
integrated with small regional airlines had shorter delays when weather causes unexpected
disruptions as compared to the non-integrated airline. Addressing foreclosure effects, Hastings and Gilbert (2005) look at the gas refinery industry and find wholesale prices to downstream rivals were strategically increased post-merger. Specifically prices were increased
when the acquired downstream retailers faced greater competition from unintegrated rivals
and the upstream refinery held significant market power.
In the health care industry, literature has also split along the IO and organizational economics divide. Baker et al. (2014) describes the juxtaposition of organizational benefits
against anti-competitive concerns with regards to vertical integration: “Integration can reduce health spending and increase quality of care by improving communication across care
settings but can also increase providers market power and facilitate ... inappropriate referrals.” (p. 756). These authors find that an increase in market share of hospitals with strong
vertical relationships had higher prices and higher spending, and looser forms of integration
may have had a very small decline on admissions and no spending impacts.
Much attention on vertical relationships in health care has been focused on physicianhospital integration where price changes may lead to welfare-decreasing outcomes. In studies that consider market-driven prices, the results of vertical integration have been more
mixed. Several studies found that prices increased after integration using private insurance
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data (Baker et al. 2014; Cuellar and Gertler 2006) while some others found there was no
significant price effect (Ciliberto and Dranove, 2006). Many of these price increases were
not accompanied by improved efficiency (Cuellar and Gertler, 2006).
Even in the absence of market-driven prices, there is still concern that vertical integration
acts as a way to direct profitable referrals downstream. This would be one reason for a
hospital to acquire a physician group (Pauly 1979). It would however only be welfaredecreasing if this leads to less patient choice or worse quality of care than if they chose to
go elsewhere. Carlin et al. (2015) found that acquisition of physician groups led to more
referrals from that group to the acquiring hospital and typically these were patients that
required high intensity, high margin care. More specifically, Nakamura (2010) found that
large, dominant tertiary hospitals were less likely to see referrals from the acquired physician
group than smaller, non-tertiary hospitals facing greater competition from rival hospitals.
This suggested that the tertiary hospitals were acquiring providers in order to improve care
coordination while non-tertiary hospitals may be acquiring to steer patients towards their
facilities.
A key difference between hospital-physician integration and hospital-PAC integration is the
control direction. In both cases, the hospital is the purchaser and therefore the holder of
residual rights. For physicians, the hospital is the downstream provider, but for post-acute
care, the hospital is upstream and therefore cannot use the PAC to push patents to its
facility. Rather, the hospital can use the PAC to discharge their patients sooner than if
they did not own the PAC. A theoretical model and empirical results presented in David
et al. (2013) demonstrate that patients leaving integrated hospitals for HHAs have shorter
length of stays in the hospital than those leaving unintegrated hospitals. The driving force
is that hospitals can transition recovering patients sooner to the integrated HHA, which
is a significantly less expensive setting, thus making a more efficient allocation of general
recovery tasks between the two providers. This is because post-acute care providers and
hospitals have been shown to substitute (recovery) care (Holahan et al., 1989). David et al.
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(2013) indicates that hospitals acquire home health agencies to move patients sooner and to
reduce inefficient coordination costs; in essence, this creates a coordinated, steady stream of
patients downstream. The outcome of interest for David et al. (2013) was inpatient length
of stay for the patient; I use his theoretical model to inform mine, but my key variable of
interest will be the post-acute length of stay (or, number of episodes in the case of home
health).
Most of the work on vertical integration in PAC settings largely focus on the coordinative
benefits as measured by outcomes and medical expenditures as opposed to any anticompetitive outcomes. Afendulis and Kessler (2011) find that the prospective payment system
lowered spending in areas of high SNF integration percentages more than low integration
areas without any outcome differences. Rahman et al. (2016b), employing a differential
distance instrumental variable to control for patient differences, also found no difference in
outcome but suggested there were savings of $2,900 for vertically integrated SNFs due to
shorter days spent in the SNF. The authors assume that the length of stay is exogenous.
The finding that integrated SNF’s have lower lengths of stay is not new to the literature.
Weiner et al. (1986), prior to the introduction of PPS for SNF’s, reports lower lengths of
stay while Liu and Black (2003) also find a similar result after PPS; thorough case-mix
control cannot account for the differences in cost and length of stay.
Interestingly, Sulvetta and Holahan (1986) and Weiner et al. (1986) both find that integrated
SNFs have significantly higher costs than free-standing SNFs. The difference in costs is
nearly double, which falls 25% after including controls for staffing and casemix; however,
staffing and casemix can account for less than half of the observed cost differences. This is
likely reminiscent of the outdated payment system in the 80s. Following PPS changes for
post-acute care settings, integrated SNFs have lower lengths of stay and lower readmission
rates (Liu and Black 2003; Rahman et al. 2016b; Stearns et al. 2006). Estimates for length
of stay range widely from 13 vs 27 days (Liu and Black 2003) to a finding of 16.7% shorter
stays (Stearns et al. 2006), and between 2.3% and 8% fewer 30-day readmissions. Similar
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to the papers from the 80s, the cost differences are not well explained by case mix. Even
using propensity stratification (Stearns et al. 2006) or shocks such as hospital-based SNF
closures (Rahman et al. 2013), these differences persist.
Most post-acute care studies focus on the SNF setting; very few study home health agencies. David et al. (2013), as mentioned above, found short inpatient length of stay without
a difference in readmissions while Konetzka et al. (2016), who use longitudinal data, found
that vertical integration had no effect on Medicare payments or readmissions (though vertical integration for SNF’s led to more Medicare payment and fewer readmissions). They
use hospital-PAC pair fixed effects which may explain the difference in results compared to
David et al. (2013) and Rahman et al. (2013). Schlenker et al. (2005) similarly finds fewer
visits and less intensity of care under PPS; the author removes patients with more than one
episode, thus does not consider on recertifications.
I offer a different explanation for the shorter stays even after controlling for hospital or
HHA casemix. I examine the length of stay (in terms of additional episodes) in HHAs as an
endogenous strategic choice in response to the payment incentives provided by Medicare.
This is the first paper to consider recertifications as a potential outcome for home health
agencies; in other papers, this has been considered an exogenous variable. Recertifications
are another way that health care providers may compete in a regulated market other than
quality or amenities. Furthermore, a crucial difference between this paper and the inducement literature is that the theory I present uses a profit-maximizing framework rather than
a physician utility framework. There also is little reason to believe that patients will arrive
at a point where they will leave their home health provider because they are receiving too
much care as they pay no costs for the care and incur no travel costs. This contribution
also applies outside of the health care industry; its results can be applicable for industries
with hourly wages with some asymmetric information on the payer side on the quality and
length of time needed to finish a job.
I additionally provide an empirical context to study the customer acquisition versus reten-
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tion trade-off and the effects of competitive dynamics, an area of literature that is predominantly model-focused due to difficulty of identifying costs in data. Features of the home
health agency context also provide an interesting opportunity to study potential benefits
to referral control, not just the oft commented anticompetitive effects. Finally, I contribute
to the literature by showing the interdependency of market structure and firm structure.
Few papers have considered how the organizational benefits of vertical integration may depend on the competitive landscape and vice versa. Most papers consider it as an either-or
question— does vertical integration translate into decreased spending (more efficiency) or
do we see anticompetitive behavior or targeted referrals towards worse quality providers?
There are a few papers that do consider the interdependency of the two: Nakamura (2010),
which shows how high-quality hospitals with market power are more likely to acquire for efficiency purposes while low- or average-quality hospitals use integration for steering purposes,
and Hastings and Gilbert (2005), which shows that vertical integration can increases prices
on rivals in the gas refinery market only if they have significant market power upstream.

1.3. Home Health Setting and Payment Structure
The post-acute care industry has seen rapid growth since the 1980s. After discharge to the
home, the post-acute care setting is the largest category of destination for Medicare patients
leaving the hospital. In 2013, 42% of Medicare patients leaving an acute-care setting were
discharged to post-acute care. Skilled nursing facilities and home health agencies dominate
the post-acute care market at 20% and 14% of hospital discharges, respectively (Avalere
October 2015). Medicare fee-for-service spending on home health agencies was $18.0 billion
in 2013 (MedPAC June 2016), which accounts for approximately 40% of home health care
payments. Medicaid and state and local governments account for another 40%, leaving the
industry largely reliant on federal and state programs as payment sources.
Medicare home health care is for patients who are homebound and certified so by a physician.
In other words, the patient has difficulty moving and leaving the house on their own. In
order to be eligible, these patients must require services such as intermittent skilled nursing
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care or physical, occupational, or speech-language therapies. Medicare also covers medical
social services, supplies and durable medical equipment, and home health aide services.
Beginning in 2000, in order to curb rising spending, a prospective payment system (PPS)
was put in place for Medicare certified HHAs. Like many PPS’s, Medicare pays the provider
a flat payment for an episode of care. For HHAs, an episode is up to 60 days, and providers
must also create a plan of care for the patient at the beginning of the episode. The creation
of such a plan is made during the first visit. The case mix group determines the base rate,
which is adjusted based on three factors.
First, these payments are multiplied by a case-mix rate determined by the patient’s conditions and service needs. The categories depend on the number of therapy visits conducted
in the 60-day episode, and a severity grading based on clinical and functional level needs,
resulting in 153 case-mix groups called Home Health Resource Groups (HHRGs)2 . Specifically, there are major thresholds for payment based on whether the patient has reached
6, 14, or 20 visits and minor thresholds in between where payment grows at a diminishing
rate. Figure 1 demonstrates the stepwise payment function based on number of therapy
visits performed for a given clinical and functional level. This is superimposed on the distribution of visits in the dataset. Second, there are also adjustments for outliers; those
who need very little care (four or fewer visits) are paid on a fee-for-service basis called Low
Utilization Payment Adjustment, while those who need significantly more care receive an
outlier bonus. CMS places a limit on total national payments for outliers at 2.5 percent of
total home health PPS payments annually. This reduces the probability of abuse by home
health agencies forcing patients into outlier status in order to gain a bonus. Third, there
are geographic adjustments for labor costs, which is important in an industry that relies
heavily on labor.
All three factors making up an HHRG—the number of visits3 , functional and clinical lev2
3

HHRGs are conceptually equal to DRGs that hospitals use for payment
This is adjusted at the end of the episode of the estimated visit count is different than the true count.
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Figure 1: Home Health Agency PPS Payment Scheme and Corresponding Visit Count

Home Health Resource Groups (HHRGs) have four features which determine payment. One feature
is the number of visits made over a 60-day episode. This schematic shows how the episode payment
amount differs as the number of visits increase for an episode while fixing the functional and clinical
levels at the lowest level. As can be seen, the payment amount makes discontinuous increases as
patients cross thresholds of visit number. The grey bars show the histogram of patients in each
of the visit number buckets. There does not appear to be corresponding discontinuous jumps in
visits to cross those thresholds. It is more profitable to “game” the payment structure through
recertifications than visits.

els4 —are estimated at the first visit of the episode where the nurse or aide goes through a
comprehensive OASIS assessment (Outcome and Assessment Information Set). OASIS uses
these questions to determine the patient’s appropriate functional and clinical level, and the
nurse lays out a treatment plan over the episode including the number and type of visits
the patient will receive.
In 2008, the PPS payment per episode without geographic adjustment ranged from $1,931
at the lowest level to $5,788 at the greatest clinical, functional and service levels. In my
data, the average cost per episode is $2,500. There are not large discontinuous jumps on
visit number (except for the jump from four or fewer visits which are paid on a fee-forservice basis) as shown in the histogram portion of Figure 1. Intuitively, this is likely due
4

Clinical levels hinge upon orthopedic, neurological, diabetic, and trauma codes for primary and secondary
diagnoses. Functional levels are based on abilities to dress, bath, toilet, and locomotion.
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to the decreasing rate of payment increase as the visit number increases. This reduces the
marginal gain of each visit within an episode while the potential marginal gain for an extra
episode is significantly larger. Even the lack of drop after twenty visits (after which there
is no pay increase) suggests that agencies are not as sensitive to discontinuous changes in
the payment structure for visit counts as compared to recertifications.
There are two other important facts about home health PPS. First, patients do not face a
copay for visits. They have very little incentive to decline additional medical care beyond
some idiosyncratic reason, as a nurse or therapy visit brings at least non-negative utility to
the patient. The patient incurs neither travel cost nor physical cost—this is unlike nearly all
other forms of medical care, including Medicare. The major implication is that this context
is unlike that of the physician demand-inducement literature where excessive inducement
may lead to patients leaving the practice (Dranove 1988).
The second notable fact is, unlike other PPSs, patients can be recertified for another 60-day
episode without a limit on number of recertifications. A recertification requires the physician
to deem the patient still in need of home health care and it must begin immediately after
the prior episode is concluded; only the initial episode requires a face-to-face visit with a
physician. However, a recertification is a similar resource-load to certifying a new episode
(as well as ending an episode). Another assessment must be completed within the last five
days of the prior episode, and a new OASIS assessment must be made accompanied by a
new care of plan and physician sign-off, which includes an estimation of how much longer
home health services may be needed are also made (Home Care Institute 2015).
Despite the introduction of PPS, Medicare spending on HHAs has steadily increased between 2000 and 2010, falling only slightly after 2010 due to growing enrollment in Medicare
Advantage over the traditional fee-for-service. From 2001, home health expenditures rose
from $9.1 billion to $19.6 billion in 2010, before tailing off to $18.0 billion by 2013. This
growth has made post-acute care the fastest-growing major spending category for Medicare
(Chandra et al. 2013).
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The number of agencies grew from 9,291 in 2007 to 12,346 agencies in 2013 (MedPAC June
2016), thus increasing the competition level in an already highly competitive industry. Due
to heavy reliance on labor and little capital investment necessary, the entry costs to the
HHA industry are very low. Theoretically, this should lead to perfect competition and
efficient outcomes5 ; however, regulated prices could potentially lead to excessive quality or
excessive lengths of stay relative to the social optimum.
The growth in agencies have been quite geographically varied. MedPAC reports show
greater rates of use in rural areas (MedPAC March 2011) and the data shows more growth
in the West, South Atlantic, and East North Central regions. This highlights the importance
of using market-level fixed effects in our specifications in order to not allow differences in
HHA use to drive results. Certificate of need (CON) laws put in place beginning in 1974 have
been shown to influence the number of agencies in a state. While obligatory for hospitals,
38 states also applied CON laws to home health agencies as well. The repeal of the federal
mandate in 1987 led to only eighteen states retaining their CON for HHAs. These states
have significantly fewer agencies (Polsky et al. 2014) and the rate of growth of agencies has
been slower than those without CON laws in place (Rahman et al. 2016a).
In addition to being competitive, the home health industry is highly localized and fragmented, as nurses can only travel so far to treat patients and state laws determine whether
agencies can work across state borders. In most cases, they are required to register separately in different states and are provided a unique Medicare provider number even though
they are owned by the same company. In the data, only 3% of patients use an HHA that
is not in the same state as their residence; of these patients, a significant portion are using
an agency that is over 100 miles implying that these are not just patients living close to
the state’s border. Due to the local nature and large portion of patients arriving from hospitals, HHAs must rely on building relationships with local hospitals for patient referrals.
5
While HHAs depend heavily on aides and nurses, in reality their capacity constraints are nonzero.
Industry experts admit hiring and retaining nurses is difficult due to nurse shortages and worse pay than
other provider settings.
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Furthermore, the need for close proximity and close relationship with hospitals is reinforced
by the coordination required between physicians and home health agencies—whether it is
transitioning the patient from the hospital and explaining medications and diagnoses or
recertifying a patient and requiring a plan of care to be created, signed by a physician, and
submitted by the agency within five days (Home Care Institute 2015).
This empirical context is interesting for many reasons. First, it is a poorly studied area
of health care but still an industry of considerable size. Because of its large reliance on
Medicare, inefficiency and waste in the home health industry can have significant effects on
national health expenditures and policy implications that affect all taxpayers. Second, there
is growing competition in an already competitive market with little entry costs, which is
uncommon in the highly regulated health care market. This creates cross-time variation in
addition to the cross-sectional variation in competition. The fragmentation of the industry
makes it ideal to study competition. Even agencies owned by the same group across different
states must be licensed in the state in which they provide care. Third, studying vertical
integration is interesting because contracts are inherently incomplete (as well as illegal) as
it is difficult to contract on exact conditions and patient severities; however, the recovery
care provided generally involves straightforward tasks. Number of visits and time spent
with the patient can be counted as well as the number of recertifications. Additionally
unlike hospitals purchasing physician practices for referrals (Pauly 1979), the downstream
firms (PACs) do not have power to control the patient stream from the upstream firm (the
hospital). Thus, PACs must depend on formal and informal relationships, marketing, or
other means to attract referrals from hospitals. This can be seen in the data—out of over
13,000 zipcodes with at least 100 patients going to a single hospital, 93% of hospitals have
a different top home health agency for patients living in the same zipcode. If patients were
choosing randomly among a few top HHA’s, we would expect to see the same portion of
patients going to these agencies regardless of hospital. This really highlights the importance
of which hospital the patient went to in selecting a home health agency. Finally, the
data used here is highly detailed and rare, allowing me to track millions of patients across
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facilities, identify their full medical care history, and create detailed measures on distance
traveled and distances to nearest hospitals.

1.4. Theory
In this section, I present a simple theoretical model that shows the trade-off home health
agencies face when choosing to invest in acquisition versus retention of patients. On the one
hand, the model demonstrates how, as the return on acquisition investment decreases per
effort spent, the agency is more likely to turn towards investing in retention. I make the assumption that competition increases the cost of getting the marginal patient for the agency.
Agencies then have a vehicle through which they may choose to increase their quantity via
recertification. On the other hand, vertical integration encourages fewer recertified episodes
of care as there may be either a decrease in the need (or cost) to invest in relationship
with hospitals or an increase in the opportunity cost of using resources to recertify instead
of transitioning new patients from the acquiring hospital. This builds upon the theory in
David et al. (2013), which shows how vertical integration can resolve task-allocation inefficiencies under the context of hospitals and post-acute care. They demonstrate how the
acquiring hospital uses the agency to substitute general recovery care from the acute-care
setting to the post-acute care setting, leading the hospital to discharge patients downstream
sooner. Here, I use the definition of vertical integration as presented in Grossman and Hart
(1986), where one entity holds the rights to control all aspects of production and decisionmaking. By controlling the downstream agency’s residual rights, the hospital has the ability
to decide when new patients begin post-acute care. It is worth noting that the effect on
recertification is an indirect effect from competition and vertical integration, not a direct
effect.
There have been models in marketing literature balancing acquisition versus retention resources for customers. These models generally are set in industries with frequent repeat
customers and assume that a customer has a lifetime profitability or “customer equity”
that firms would like to maximize (Berger and Bechwati 2001, Gupta et al. 2006). However
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unlike these authors and other authors in the marketing literature, these models differ from
my setting in several important ways. First, they consider consumer utility functions and
their proclivity for switching between firms for the same product. I do not consider the
patient utility function because I assume that patients are highly responsive to the HHAs
referred by the hospital. And because I assume every episode of care has positive benefit
to the patient though at a diminishing rate and the patient incurs neither travel nor monetary costs, then they agree with any HHA’s assessment for additional episodes. Further,
patients do not tend to switch providers between care episodes6 and particularly not based
on any marketing aimed at consumers the HHA invests in. We may think of the agency’s
“marketing promotions” to grow their new patient base as geared towards improving their
relationships with, and thus referrals from, hospitals or physicians. Finally, I assume that
the HHA does not invest in price discounts to patients or kickbacks towards hospitals as
these are not allowed.
As mentioned earlier, there also have been similar models in literature focus on hourly wage
contracts for lawyers (Schwartz and Mitchell 1970, Danzon 1983). In particular, Emons
(2000) shows that whenever a lawyer has excess capacity and is paid under an hourly wage
contract, the lawyer will spend more hours when s/he has insufficient number of cases than
when s/he does not. This work also relates to any hourly wage contract of uncertain or
asymmetric information on the length of time required to finish the task. Of course, this
setting differs in that there are multiple players involved ranging from payers (Medicare)
and other providers (hospitals with vertical relationships). Thus, I expand this work to
consider impacts of competition as well as vertical integration.
The set-up is a simple static, two-period profit-maximization problem with convex costs,
which are increasingly costly with greater quantity7 . I do not anticipate any shocks between
periods that would change the dynamics. Quantity (Q) has two parts: N1 , the new patients
6

In the data, this occurs about 9% of the time.
The results of this section also hold if the provider is not a strict profit-maximizer but instead is a profit
and quantity maximizer. See Appendix A.1.2 for this theory.
7
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entering the agency in period 1; N2 , the new patients entering in period 2; and R, the number
of patients that are recertified from period 1 and remain in period 2. This can be seen as an
extensive margin versus an intensive margin, both of which are firm choices. I define R as a
function of N1 and the recertification rate r so that R = rN1 while (1 − r)N1 represents the
number of patients that were discharged from the agency from the previous period. The
agency’s profits are increasing in quantity and decreasing in costs.
For simplicity, I assume each patient is the same severity and thus receives the same Medicare payment p̄ for a period, which is defined as a 60-day episode. I also assume that each
patient medically needs to stay only for one period and a patient is only recertified for one
additional period if he is recertified. Thus the incoming patients for this period, Nt , and
the patients retained from the last period, rNt−1 , are the only patients for the agency to
treat. Additionally, the patients retained are retained unnecessarily, as defined by the social
cost (Medicare payment) being greater than the personal benefits to the patient. However,
the model results still hold if there are more periods under the same patient assumptions.
The purpose of identical patients and set treatment lengths is to show that recertification
rates can change in the way I expect without regard to patient severity; that is, it is a pure
profit-maximizing strategic choice to increase or decrease recertification rates.
There are three cost functions: a medical cost Cq (Q), acquisition cost C1 (Nt ), and recertification cost C2 (R). The medical (or treatment) cost is simplified to be a linear function with
constant marginal cost: Cq (Q) = cq ∗ Q. The acquisition cost can be thought of a marketing
cost, cost of building relationships with hospitals, and the costs of transitioning the patient
from hospital to home care. This function is strictly convex: C1 (Nt ) = Ntα , which can
be justified because it is easier to obtain the first few patients but as the agency tries to
build its clientele or relationship with hospitals, it becomes harder and harder to get that
marginal patient. Patient intake upon hospital discharge also has transition costs, including coordinating with the hospital regarding care instructions, prescriptions, and gaining
an understanding of the patient’s support and own abilities.
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Recertification cost is also strictly convex of the form C2 (R) = Rβ . Recertification requires
an assessment appointment within the last 5 days of the first episode, filing paperwork with
Medicare, and coordination with the patient’s physician such as obtaining the physician’s
signature and discussion of the patient’s status and needs. There may also be a cost to
agency to recertify patients unnecessarily. This may include a (monetary-form of) psychological cost to unnecessary care or a cost due to undertaking greater risk of getting caught
or fined by Medicare for excessive care. This also makes sense since we do see neither all
patients recertified nor patients endlessly recertified, so there must be a cost to the provider
for over-providing care.
I show the equilibrium optimal levels of N1 , N2 , and r and under what circumstances a
shift in Nt leads to an increase in r. The second period is discounted by λ rate.
The agency’s overall profit function is revenue minus costs in two periods:

π1 = p̄(N1 ) − Cq (N1 ) − C1 (N1 )
π2 = p̄(N2 + R) − Cq (N2 + R) − C1 (N2 ) − C2 (R)
where,

R = rN1
0≤r≤1

or,

π = [p̄(N1 ) − Cq (N1 ) − C1 (N1 )] + λ[p̄(N2 + R) − Cq (N2 + R) − C1 (N2 ) − C2 (R)]

The first order conditions with respect to N1 , N2 and r are as follows:
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∂π/∂N1 :
∂π/∂N2 :
∂π/∂r :



∂C
∂Q2 ∂C1 ∂R
∂C2
∂Q1
−
+ λ (p̄ − cq )
−
−
=0
(p̄ − cq )
∂N1 ∂N1
∂N1
∂R ∂N1 ∂N1


∂Q2
∂C2
λ (p̄ − cq )
−
=0
∂N2 ∂N2


∂Q2
∂C2 ∂R
=0
λ (p̄ − cq )
−λ
∂r
∂R ∂r

These first order conditions (FOCs) are the typical economic result of marginal benefit
equaling the marginal cost. To further examine the relationship between N1 , N2 and r, I
substitute the cost functions and show under what circumstances N1 , N2 and r have an
inverse relationship.
Substituting in the cost functions as well as Qt = Rt + Nt and Rt = rNt−1 , the FOCs now
become:
(p̄ − cq )(1 + λr) =αN1α−1 + λβrβ N1β−1

(1.1a)

λ(p̄ − cq ) =λαN2α−1

(1.1b)

λ(p̄ − cq )N1 =λβN1β rβ−1

(1.1c)

We can ignore N2 as it is solved without regard towards N1 , r. So taking the ratios of the
FOCs with respect to N1 and r, we find,

1 + λr =

αN1α−1 + βλrβ N1β−1
βN1β−1 rβ−1

which simplifies to,
β(N1 r)β−1 = αN1α−1
Solving for r,
∗

r =



α ∗α−β
N
β 1
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1/(β−1)
(1.2)

1.4.1. Prediction under increasing competition
Now consider a positive shock to the costs of Nt−1 that will affect Rt ; let’s assume it is an
increase of γ > 1 such that C10 = γN1α . This increase in C1 to C10 leads to a decrease in N1∗
to N10∗ until the marginal benefit of N1 is high enough to equate marginal benefit and cost
once again. This also affects the marginal costs of r by a multiplier of γ, thus making new
solution of optimal r0∗ to be:

0



r =

γα ∗α−β
N
β 1

1/(β−1)
(1.3)

When is r0 > r∗ ? This is the same as asking, when is



N1∗
N10

α−β

< γ? Substituting in for

the ratio N1∗ /N10 , this can be solved8 :


1

γ α−1

α−β

<γ

1−β

γ α−1 < 1

Because of strict convexity, it is clear that r0∗ > r∗ when α, β > 1. To understand intuitively
why this is the case, the decline in N1∗ to N10∗ actually lowers the marginal cost of r, which
causes the firm to increase its optimal level of r until once again the marginal cost (which is
increasing with r) equates with the marginal benefit. That is, r becomes relatively cheaper
on the margin when N1 is more costly. This occurs at a higher r at a steeper point in the
cost curve. This is graphically demonstrated in Figure 2.
Prediction 1 is summed up as follows:
1. The home health agency will recertify patients at a higher rate following a decline in N
(for example, due to greater costs to attaining N following an increase in competition)
as long as costs are strictly convex.
8

See Appendix A.1.1 for the mathematical details
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Figure 2: Graphical display of Endogenous N Theory

0
When CN (or C1 (N ), the cost of attracting new patients) increase to CN
, the optimal choice of N1
∗
0
falls from N1 to N1 due to the faster rising marginal costs. However the decline in N1 allows for
an increase in recertifications R until the marginal benefit at R0 is equal to the marginal benefit,
demonstrated by the steeper curve of the revenue curve.

1.4.2. Prediction under vertical integration
How does vertical integration affect the amount of r that the agency puts forth? We can
think of an agency being purchased by a hospital in two ways with the same result. First, we
may think of integration as an exogenous shock to N , the number of patients the agency is
sent by hospitals, as integration means that the agency locks in a referral source for patients.
Or similarly, it can be thought of as an exogenous shock to the cost of N , C1 . Consider if
γ < 1 from equation (1.3). This is supported in the data that integrated hospitals send on
average 62% of their patients to the integrated agency compared to about 50% of patients
sent from an unintegrated hospital to their most frequently used agency. Being acquired by
a hospital represents a distinct increase in the agency’s patient flow. As discussed above, we
should see an decrease in recertification rate when there is an increase in patients arriving
given sufficient convexity of costs.
A second way to incorporate vertical integration into this model is as an increase in the cost
of recertifying patients. This might be the case because, as shown in David et al. (2013),
hospitals integrate with home health agencies in order to shift recovering patients into home
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care sooner than with an unintegrated agency where there might be hold-up, coordination,
or capacity issues. The joint profit function for the integrated hospital and agency is to
discharge and transition to home care earlier, which allows hospitals to free up acute-care
beds sooner. Agencies using resources to recertify many patients will make it more difficult
for hospitals to transition their patients downstream to those agencies on the margin. It
may also be the case that the hospital system is more concerned about risk of a Medicare
audit.
I add one more key prediction:
2. Vertically integrated agencies retain patients at a smaller rate compared to those that
are not integrated.
It is worth noting that it is not necessarily the case that vertical integration is social-welfare
enhancing. Vertical integration may harm social welfare through two avenues. First, if
hospitals transition many patients to their own home health agencies earlier when these
patients are in need of more intensive services, there might be greater pressure for the HHA
to overly reduce their recertifications and worsen patient outcomes. Second, the redirection
of patients from other agencies to their acquired agency reduces N to rival HHAs. This
is similar to the anticompetitive ‘vertical control’ found in vertical integration literature
studying other industries. But instead of raising the prices as would be the case in other
price-setting industries, this effectively leads to a tightening of competition for patients from
the remaining hospitals and thus an increase in the rate of unnecessary recertifications and
in Medicare spending compared to patient benefit.
In sum, I have shown that when taking into consideration a cost of recertification, a hospital’s preference to pass along general recovery tasks downstream, and home health agencies’
increasing costs of recertifying patients, slower patient flow per home health agency results
in too many recertifications whereas a guaranteed flow has the opposite effect. The level
of competition and the organizational structure, both of which determine the patient flow,
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play significant roles in determining the strategic level of recertifications and may also affect patient outcomes. I examine my predictions empirically using Medicare data, which is
described in the next section.
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CHAPTER 2 : Data and Empirical Framework
2.1. Data and Sample
This study considers only patients discharged from an inpatient hospital setting and transition to a home health agency. A transition is defined as discharge from hospital and
admission to a home health agency within three days. Using only the set of patients transitioning from an acute-care setting lessens the concern that the recertification results stem
from home-care patients that are substituting long-term care for HHA services. I use patient
level Medicare Part A claims data from the Medicare Provider and Analysis Review (MEDPAR) Files, which contains 100% of the inpatient and SNF claims filed for Fee-For-Service
(FFS) beneficiaries. In addition, I use Medicare home health claims data that allows us to
link patients across provider groups and over time. The study length is 2007 to 2013. I also
add demographic information from Census and American Community Service surveys.
The Medicare claims data files contain a near complete record of medical facility use. The
MEDPAR files include: date of admission and discharge, procedure and diagnosis codes (up
to 10 for 2007 and up to 25 for years after 2007), total payment amounts, and information on
the patient such as zipcode, age, and race. The home health claims data also show similar
information: beginning and end date of each episode, recertification, diagnosis, home health
PPS group, payment amount, number of home health visits and type, as well as the unique
identifier that allows linkage.
To these, I add provider level information primarily using three types of reports. First, I
use the Healthcare Cost Report Information System (HCRIS), which asks hospitals to list
the other provider groups with shared ownership and their respective Medicare Provider
Number. This identifies the vertical integration between hospital and HHA. Second, I add
Provider of Service Files for facility-level information, including geographic location and
PAC characteristics such as urban or rural location, profit status, and bed count. Third,
I use the American Hospital Association (AHA) annual survey to add hospital specific
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characteristics.
I exclude hospitals that are children’s hospitals, long term care hospitals, rehabilitation
hospitals, and I exclude patients not from one of the 50 states or District of Columbia,
under the age of 65, and enrolled in Medicare Advantage (MA) as MA patients tend to
have incomplete claims. I also exclude patients with HHRG’s that imply their home health
stay following a hospital discharge is not their first episode despite no earlier connecting
claims being present in the data. This incongruity suggests that I may be missing the
claim of their true initial visit as my data only contains home health episodes following
hospital discharges. This is less than 2% of the data. I drop patients with zipcodes that
contradict their listed state residence (1.6%), patients who attend a home health agency
over 100 miles from their zipcode as this far distance may imply that their zipcode residence
may not actually be where they are residing during care1 (2.2%), and patients who attend
a home health agency not in their residing state (1.1%). This leaves us with 5.89 million
discharges to over 12,500 unique home health agencies from 4,450 hospitals 2 .
2.1.1. Summary Statistics
Summary statistics are shown in Table 1 for all patients discharged to home health in column
(1) and split by vertical integration in columns (2) and (3). About 60% of all patients
are female and they are predominantly white with an average age of 78.5. They average
5.78 days in an acute-care hospital and have an average charlson index, which measures
comorbidities, of 1.88. Most patients are served by a not-for-profit hospital (75.9%), by a
hospital size of 386 beds on average, and in an urban area (87.8%). On the other hand,
patients are more closely split on profit status of the HHA used, about 46.1% are cared for
1
The average distance traveled by a home health aide in the U.S. was 10.79 miles Foundation for Hospice
and Home Care 2015.
2
There was some concern that very small agencies (<10 patients per year) may be substantially different
than other agencies in their profit-maximizing strategies. This was a very small percentage of patients
at 1.24% of the sample, but almost half of firms that enter or exit the data during my time frame were
affected. In order to maximize entry and exit variation, I leave these agencies in the dataset. There were
not significant differences after including these agencies–for example, the point estimate decreased slightly
for HRR and HSA fixed effects (-0.0407 to -0.0339; -0.0433 to -0.0363 respectively).
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by for profit HHAs compared to 49.6% by non-profit HHAs.
One of the main concerns when comparing patient recertifications in vertically integrated
to non-integrated systems is patient selection into the vertically integrated system (which
necessitates that both the hospital and agency attended are integrated under the same
system). Columns (2) and (3) in Table 1 show the differences between these patients, and
it is clear that there are differences in race, severity, and type of facility that integrates.
The vertically integrated entity has higher rates of AMI (by 0.25 percentage points), heart
failure (0.94 percentage points) and pneumonia (0.92 percentage points). Similarly, the
Charlson Index difference and number of risk factors are higher for the VI entities (1.896
to 1.872, and 2.086 to 2.042). Only for HHRG case mix values are non-integrated entities
greater than the integrated ones (1.21 to 1.35). In sum, there are differences in observable
characteristics between the two samples; notably, the vertically integrated patients tend to
be sicker.
In Figure 3, the cluster of gray are average patients seen less than 13 visits in an episode
of varying functional levels and split into two parts, a lower clinical rating and a higher
clinical rating. Each of these categories make up the HHRG. The cluster of blue are exactly
the same except a higher intensity level (14+ visits in an episode). The shading (as well as
circle versus triangle shape) show the difference between clinical rating. Of note, generally
speaking, the higher the severity of functional level and the higher the severity of clinical
rating, the average recertifications increase. So more severe HHRG casemix leads to higher
recertification rates— another observable measure of severity on recertification.
There are also notable differences in provider characteristics. Patients receiving care from
an integrated system are more likely to have attended a not-for-profit hospital (84.7%
versus 74%) of a smaller size (360 beds versus 391), less likely to have attend a teaching
hospital than non-integrated hospitals (41% versus 44%) in an urban area (81.2% versus
89.2%). These integrated hospitals are more likely to be in concentrated markets (HHI of
1920 versus 1600). Similarly, patients attending integrated agencies are significantly more
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Table 1: Summary Statistics by Vertical Integration
Overall Sample
(1)
All
SE

Sample split by Vertical Integration
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
Not VI
VI
Diff.
T-stat

Patient Characteristics
Male
Race: White
Race: Black
Race: Hispanic
Age
AMI
Heart Failure
Pneumonia
Charlson Index
Num. Risk Factors
Case Mix
LOS
Readmissions
Miles to Hosp

0.3991
0.8571
0.0946
0.0119
78.4900
0.0206
0.0680
0.0561
1.8762
2.0500
1.3220
5.7811
0.1694
11.9017

0.490
0.350
0.293
0.108
8.283
0.142
0.252
0.230
1.834
1.549
0.605
5.039
0.375
16.008

0.3991
0.8499
0.0981
0.0125
78.3845
0.0202
0.0664
0.0545
1.8720
2.0424
1.3458
5.7937
0.1696
12.6861

0.3990
0.8916
0.0780
0.0091
78.9901
0.0227
0.0757
0.0637
1.8960
2.0858
1.2093
5.7211
0.1682
8.1830

0.0001
-0.0417
0.0201
0.0034
-0.6049
-0.0025
-0.0094
-0.0092
-0.0243
-0.0436
0.1364
0.0716
0.0013
4.5019

0.2296
-109.8128
63.2665
28.7563
-67.2980
-16.1145
-34.2476
-36.9651
-12.1948
-25.9348
208.4436
13.0799
3.2814
260.4355

Hospital Characteristics
Not For Profit
For Profit
Teaching Hosp
Total Hosp beds
Urban
Inpatient Claim Amount

0.7591
0.1405
0.4402
386.17
0.8784
10548.99

0.428
0.348
0.496
310.18
0.327
10303.68

0.7406
0.1626
0.4468
391.56
0.8924
10722.79

0.8468
0.0359
0.4088
360.64
0.8122
9725.07

-0.1060
0.1266
0.0381
31.05
0.0803
997.30

-229.4013
338.8385
70.7293
92.23
227.3044
89.22

Agency Characteristics
Any Recert.
For Profit HHA
Not For Profit HHA
HHA Urban
Total HHA Spending
HHA Spending/Episode

0.1566
0.4605
0.4961
0.8577
3499.84
2541.44

0.363
0.498
0.500
0.349
4092.47
1416.35

0.1689
0.5417
0.4241
0.8671
3664.52
2594.89

0.0980
0.0757
0.8375
0.8131
2719.18
2288.09

0.0709
0.4657
-0.4131
0.0540
945.01
306.73

180.2458
920.2852
-801.4116
142.6613
213.57
200.17

Market Characteristics
HHI-hospital
HHA HHI
Exog. HHI
Exog HHI (regional)
Pct 65+
Observations

0.1654
0.3103
0.1529
0.1547
0.1421
5899536

0.144
0.160
0.155
0.153
0.040

0.1597
0.2967
0.1426
0.1443
0.1418
4872189

0.1926
0.3744
0.2020
0.2041
0.1439
1027347

-0.0330
-0.0778
-0.0595
-0.0599
-0.0022

-212.0871
-454.8999
-358.2680
-364.2932
-49.9084

This table shows person-level characteristics of the sample. AMI is acute myocardial infarction, and LOS is
the inpatient length of stay. The Charlson Index is a measure of comorbidities, and risk factors are the sum
of risk factors as categorized by the Hierarchical Condition Categories designated by CMS.
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Figure 3: Average recertification rates by clinical rating within visit and functional categories

Each color-shape grouping is a different HHRG; the functional level has been fixed for all points. The
darker color represents an increase in clinical level, and movement from grey to blue shows the change
in visit intensity. This graph shows that higher HHRG ratings are correlated with recertification
rates on some level.

likely to attend a not-for-profit HHA than those leaving the system or those attending
an unintegrated hospital (84% versus 42%) and more concentrated agencies (HHI of 3740
versus 2960).
The selection differences are reinforced in Table 2.A, which shows the differences between
those who are recertified at least once and those who are not. The summary statistics
demonstrate that those who are recertified tend to be women, black, and slightly older
with higher rates of heart failure and pneumonia but no difference for AMI diagnoses.
Unsurprisingly, they are also more likely to have higher comorbidity rates (Charlson Index),
more risk factors, and a higher HHRG casemix value.
Another concern that the reader may have is that patients with outlier status are significantly sicker and make up a large enough percent of the sample that the results are skewed
by this group of people that may be substantially different from the rest of the general
population. I do find that patients that are deemed outliers and get a payment adjustment
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Table 2: Summary Statistics by Recertification Status and Instrumental Variable Validation
(1)
(2)
No Recert
Recert
A. Person-level characteristics by recertification status
Male
0.4056
0.3641
Race: White
0.8676
0.8009
Race: Black
0.0860
0.1411
Race: Hispanic
0.0120
0.0114
Age
78.3765
79.1013
AMI
0.0208
0.0198
Heart Failure
0.0630
0.0949
Pneumonia
0.0544
0.0656
Comorbidity: COPD
0.2565
0.3087
Comorbidity: Diabetes
0.2229
0.2673
Comorbidity: Cancer
0.0760
0.0772
Charlson Index
1.8136
2.2129
Num. Risk Factors
1.9692
2.4853
Case Mix
1.2926
1.4802
LOS
5.6211
6.6427
Readmissions
0.1584
0.2283
Miles to Hosp
11.8970
11.9271
(1)
(2)
Below Median Above Median
B. Person-level characteristics by differential distance of
and non-integrated hospital
Male
0.4033
0.3961
Race: White
0.8589
0.8559
Race: Black
0.0931
0.0957
Race: Hispanic
0.0125
0.0114
Race: Other
0.0355
0.0370
Age
78.4721
78.5028
AMI
0.0206
0.0206
Heart Failure
0.0683
0.0678
Pneumonia
0.0553
0.0567
Comorbidity: COPD
0.2625
0.2663
Comorbidity: Diabetes
0.2292
0.2303
Comorbidity: Cancer
0.0774
0.0754
Charlson Index
1.8740
1.8777
Num. Risk Factors
2.0433
2.0548
Case Mix
1.3145
1.3273
LOS
5.7849
5.7784
Readmissions
0.1690
0.1696
Miles to Hosp
12.9209
11.1765
Any Recert.
0.1529
0.1592

(3)
Diff.

(4)
Tstat

0.0415
0.0667
-0.0552
0.0006
-0.7244
0.0010
-0.0319
-0.0112
-0.0522
-0.0445
-0.0012
-0.3994
-0.5161
-0.1876
-1.0212
-0.0699
-0.0310

74.8286
168.7479
-166.6929
4.5870
-77.2311
6.4319
-111.9522
-43.0302
-104.5906
-93.4265
-4.0001
-192.8749
-296.3434
-275.3968
-179.3755
-164.8864
-1.7110

(3)
(4)
Diff.
Tstat
nearest integrated
-0.0073
-0.0030
0.0026
-0.0011
0.0015
0.0307
-0.0000
-0.0005
0.0014
0.0038
0.0011
-0.0020
0.0036
0.0115
0.0129
-0.0065
0.0006
-1.7444
0.0063

-17.8222
-10.3891
10.7513
-12.0400
9.5767
4.4419
-0.0440
-2.4921
7.4703
10.3656
3.0788
-9.1893
2.3575
8.8749
25.4907
-1.5459
1.8788
-130.7239
20.7342

Differential distance is defined as the distance from patient zip code to nearest vertically
integrated hospital minus the distance to the nearest non-vertically integrated hospital. AMI
is acute myocardial infarction, and COPD is chronic obstructive pulmonary disease. The
Charlson Index is a measure of comorbidities, and risk factors are the sum of risk factors as
categorized by the Hierarchical Condition Categories designated by CMS.
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accordingly: have higher Charlson comorbidity indices on average, significantly more recertifications (60% have at least one recertification with most of these having more than one),
but not necessarily significantly higher average inpatient spending costs (see Figure 4).
However, notably, these patients only make up 1.5% of the sample. It is also worth noting
that total national payments for outliers are limited at 2.5 percent of total home health
PPS payments annually by CMS. In the data, I find that the recertification rates overall on
average with the outliers included is 15.68% and without the outliers included is 15.05%,
which is not a large change on the average. Because of the small percentage of the outliers,
I have left them in the sample. As a robustness check, I also rerun the main specifications
without the patients with outlier status and find that the main results have no significant
changes. These tables can be found in the Appendix Table B.4.
Figure 4: Comparing Distribution of Variables of Interest by Outlier Status

These boxplots show the differences in the distribution of Charlson Index (measure of comorbidity),
recretification rates, and inpatient spending between patients that have outlier status and those that
do not.

2.1.2. Main Variables of Interest
There are two main explanatory variables: market competition and vertical integration.
Vertical integration is a binary variable equaling one when the patient is discharged from
a hospital to the HHA owned by that hospital so this is defined at the Hospital-HHA pair
level. Approximately 28% of the patient sample attended a hospital that owns an integrated
HHA. Of these, 62% of patients receive care from the integrated HHA when discharged from
a hospital that owns a PAC. So amongst all patients in the sample, an average of 17.6% of
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them receive care from an integrated hospital-HHA system, as shown in Table 3. Of those
who did not attend an integrated hospital, only 7.85% received care from an HHA that
is owned by another hospital. About 3.3% of patients attend hospital-agency pairs that
change their integration status during the time period; this variation is used for the pair
fixed effects, described in further detail in the next section.
Table 3: Summary Statistics of Patient Flow

(1)
Mean
Percent of Patients going to...
Hospital that Owns HHA
Vertically Integrated Hospital and HHA
Of VI Hosp: Went to VI HHA
Of VI Hosp: Went to a diff Int. HHA
Of VI Hosp: Went to non-VI HHA
Of Non-VI Hosp: Went to VI HHA
Observations

0.286
0.176

(0.452)
(0.381)

0.617
0.0481
0.335
0.0785
5899536

(0.486)
(0.214)
(0.178)
(0.269)

This table shows descriptive statistics of the flow of patients
across vertically integrated (VI) and non-integrated (non-VI)
hopsitals and home health agencies (HHA).

Market competition for home health agencies are defined as a weighted average of the
Herfindahl–Hirschman Index (HHI) of each zipcode where the home health agency has a
patient. Thus, this is defined at the home health agency level. This value is demeaned in
all regressions so that it maintains some interpretability. I also calculate an exogenously
predicted HHI to correct for omitted variable bias and measurement error in two ways— the
first using a single conditional logit model for the nation and the second using 10 different
geographic regions for greater flexibility of taste parameters. I discuss these in more detail
in the Empirical Strategy section. The average HHI is 3100 while the exogenously predicted
ones are 1530 and 1550 respectively3 . Variation in HHI over time and markets stem from
changes in the taste of patients/hospital referrals, market share changes, and entry and exit
3
It is common for the predicted HHI’s to be lower than the HHI’s calculated using actual flows (Kessler
and McClellan 2000).
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of agencies. 8,255 home health agencies are present in 2007; 2,315 firms exit over the time
period including 959 that enter after 2007 and exit before 2013. 3,208 firms enter over the
time period and remain through 2013, the majority of which were for-profit agencies.
My primary outcome variable of interest is the binary variable of whether or not there is
a recertification for each patient. Recertification is defined as an episode beginning on the
same or following day as the end of the previous episode. While there is no limit on the
number of recertifications a patient may have, 85% of them have only one episode, thus having a high number of zeros and making the number of recertifications extremely long-tailed,
which may make the result upward biased. 9% of patients have only one recertification.
Only 2.86% have two recertifications, and about 3% have more than two. I run zero-inflated
negative binomial and poisson models (Appendix Table B.6) to ensure the results are not
sensitive to this restriction on recertifications. I focus on two secondary outcome measures:
readmissions within 30 days of hospital discharge to measure differences in quality between
facilities and Medicare spending to measure differences in spending and intensity. I show
the spending at the inpatient and home health level separately as well as use a combined
total spending variable that also includes additional costs from 30-day readmissions.

2.2. Empirical Strategy
I examine the effect of both vertical integration and the concentration of the HHA market
on the agency’s decision to recertify a patient. Vertical integration changes the agency’s
focus from maximizing profits as a free-standing agency to maximizing total profits under
the hospital-agency system. In the latter case, the agency plays a key role in transitioning
patients from the inpatient setting sooner, leading to the prioritizing of capacity, intake
resources, and/or a guaranteed flow of incoming patients. Competition for new patients
increases the cost of attracting the marginal new patient. I have longitudinal data spanning
7 years, which will help remove time-invariant unobservables through various fixed effects
models that may be potentially conflicting. Despite this, several selection issues still exist.
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For vertical integration, there are two levels of omitted variable bias: first, there is the
patient-level endogeneity where the severity of the patient may influence the hospital and
agency choices as well as the recertification rate. Second, there is the provider-level endogeneity where unobservable factors correlated with the hospital’s choice to integrate (and
which agency to integrate with) may also affect the patient’s recertification rate. For example, the hospital may adopt a practice pattern that prioritizes reducing the length of
therapy the patient will need after their acute care and prefer greater monitoring, leading
them to purchase a home health agency. It may actually be the acute care that lowers
the rate of recertification regardless of the integration status. Another example is that the
hospital decides to purchase an agency, and they decide on a high-quality agency, where
the quality of care reduces the need for recertifications.
Ideally, I would have an empirical strategy that removes both biases simultaneously; unfortunately, an exogenous shock to integration statuses or a perfect instrument could not
be found that would allow such a strategy. Instead, I opt to attack the biases separately
and draw conclusions regarding the influence of the bias using those results. To address the
first, I use differential distance as an instrumental variable and use this information to understand how much patient severity may be influencing the results. To address the provider
endogeneity, I use both hospital-level and hospital-agency pair fixed effects that can help
give a sense of how influential the provider-level endogeneity may be. The disadvantage to
this strategy however is that it cannot rule out any time-variant unobservables, which can
confound the vertical integration effect, particularly if the variance occurs in the same year
as the integration change.
For market competition, the main concern is any measurement error in the definition of
competition used and unobservable factors affecting patient flows that may be a symptom
of the competitiveness itself which can result in biased results. To deal with this, I construct
an HHI measure using predicted patient flows, estimated from a maximum likelihood model
based on relative distances from hospitals and agency characteristics. I discuss in further
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detail my instrument, the provider fixed effects, and construction of market competition
variable in this chapter. I also examine the interaction between vertical integration and
competition.
Spending and outcome impacts are of interest as well because policymakers are concerned
about the social implications of vertical integration and competition effects on recertifications. Studying the impacts on spending and outcomes provides evidence for these
implications— are the differences in recertifications under vertical integration versus nonintegrated low-value or resulting in more readmissions?
2.2.1. Base empirical specification
My basic empirical specifications, which I use to first show correct directional results, are4 :

Yijt = α + β1 Indepjht + β2 Xit + β3 Hosph + HHAj + Marketit + φt + ei

(2.1)

where i indexes patients, j home health agencies, h hospitals, and t time in years. Y
measures the main outcomes: whether or not the patient had any recertification (Yijt = 0 if
the patient had only one HHA episode (zero recertifications) and Yijt = 1 if the patient had
more than one episode), inpatient and home health agency spending (logged), and whether
the patient had a readmission. The main independent variables of interest are V Iijht , which
is a binary indicator of whether or not that hospital-HHA pair to which the patient used was
integrated in year t, and HHIjt , which is an agency-specific Herfindahl-Hirschman Index
(HHI). This HHI value is generated by first calculating the HHI for each zipcode in which
HHA has patients, then taking the patient-weighted average of all these zip-HHI’s. The
result is an overall HHI that is different for each agency but takes into account the size of
the zipcode, the extent of the agency’s market share in that zipcode, and the number of
4

I run these using OLS, which is best for taking advantage of such a large dataset as probits or logits
require significant computing power which becomes more difficult with larger datasets and also suffer from
incidental parameters under fixed effects. Using a 30% sample, I also run a probit model of the base specification with and without controls (see Appendix Table B.5), which shows the results are not significantly
different.
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zipcodes in which the HHA participates.
Xit is a vector of patient characteristics, which include age, sex, race, HHA casemix weight,
HHRG codes, aggregate Charlson index as well as 22 control variables for comorbidity
conditions and 31 control variables for risk factors of care complications. These risk factors
follow the procedure performed in Horwitz et al. (2011), which was relied upon heavily
by the Centers of Medicaid and Medicare (CMS) for their risk adjustment for readmissions
penalties. It groups categories of CMS Condition Categories into risk factors that contribute
significantly to readmission rates.
Hosph is a vector of hospital characteristics. These include profit status, teaching status, number of beds, and urban location. In the hospital fixed effects models, the hospital
characteristics predominantly are not time varying, except for bed size which is included,
and therefore will be washed away in the provider-level fixed effects. Similarly for any
HHA characteristics, HHAj , these are the non-time varying qualities of profit status and
urban location. In addition, I include market-level characteristics, Marketit , of hospital concentration index (using the traditional calculation of HHI), skilled nursing facility
(SNF) concentration index, the percentage of the population over age 65, and the number
of long-term care beds in the market. These are meant to control for potential demand-side
explanations for increasing competition that may confound the true effect on recertifications. I include SNF HHI to control for time-varying changes in post-acute care usage or
distribution of patients among the different post-acute care facilities within the market.
Every specification has year controls, φt , and standard errors are all robust and clustered
at the hospital referral region (HRR) level for vertical integration specifications or at the
hospital service area (HSA) level for competition specifications, as defined by the Dartmouth
Health Atlas. I primarily use the HRR level for vertical integration because it is defined
by contiguous area from which tertiary hospitals receive most of their patients and VI is
dictated by hospital referrals and regions. It is the most commonly used market definition
for studying hospital outcomes and geographic variation in hospital spending (Newhouse
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and Garber 2013). However, for specifications focused on competition effects, I prefer HSA
market level because the competitive level is at the agency, which competes on a more local
level. Thus, I use HSA fixed effects for all competition specifications.
2.2.2. Identifying causal effects of vertical integration
The base empirical specifications do not generate causal results, only correlative patterns.
These results are likely subject to omitted variable bias and selection biases as mentioned
earlier. Vertical integration itself and which patients that hospitals send to their vertically
integrated entities are hospital choices, and the hospital where patients attend are patient
decisions. This makes the base specification in equation 2.1 biased.
My instrument for vertical integration is differential distance from a patient’s zip centroid
to the nearest vertically-integrated and non-integrated hospital, regardless of where the
patient actually attended. The measure is the natural log of the distance from patient zip
centroid to the nearest integrated hospital minus the natural log of the distance to the
nearest non-integrated hospital. This follows from the strategy presented in Rahman et al.
(2016b), which uses the hospital differential distance, and Hirth et al. (2014), using skilled
nursing facility differential distance. In addition, I address concerns of patient selection on
observables by employing a large number of individual level controls including comorbidities,
risk factors, demographic information, case mix level, and home health diagnosis groupings.
An instrumental variable must both be correlated with the endogenous variable, in this case
vertical integration, and be uncorrelated with the error term, also known as the exclusion
restriction. Distance plays a significant role in choice of hospital as patients incur travel
costs when seeking hospital care; they are much more likely to go to the nearest hospital
regardless of severity. Furthermore it is shown in the data that hospitals with an integrated
agency are more likely to send patients to their integrated agency (see Table 3). Thus, being
relatively closer to a VI hospital will generally result in going to the VI hospital and VI
agency solely on the basis of travel costs. Figure 5 depicts a causal graph of the empirical
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model, showing the direction of causation via arrows.
Figure 5: Graphical model of instrumental variable differential distance

This graphical model shows the direction of causality along the arrows. The causal relationship
of interest is shown in blue: what is the effect of attending the vertically integrated hospital and
vertically integrated agency on recertifications? Two confounders are patient characteristics, which
can be resolved by the instrumental variable, and quality or treatment patterns, which may still
confound. For this I use provider-level fixed effects.

The instrument randomizes patients to VI or non-VI designation based on the relative distance of their home location to the VI hospital. This includes not only the hospital attended
but also the agency attended. The instrument is exogenous to unobservable patient severity
since patients generally do not choose where they live based on the relative distances to
hospitals by vertical integration status, and furthermore, the patient would not be expected
to choose hospital or residential location based on which agency he would be more likely to
use. Thus I expect to find differential distance to be uncorrelated with unobserved factors
that may influence recertification rates at the patient level. The instrument does a good
job randomizing patients based on distance, as can be seen in Table 2.B, where the severity
differences between those living closer to VI hospitals and those living further are much
smaller than the true VI differences.
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The differential distance IV resolves patient level endogeneity, specifically unobservable
severity. However, there still remains the question about provider-level endogeneity. Any
unobservable provider characteristics that influence recertification rates directly may be
falsely attributed to vertical integration. Examples of this include the decision to integrate,
which agency to integrate with, or any practice patterns oriented towards both high quality
and integrated care. To target these questions, I take advantage of changes in integration
structure over the time period by including hospital fixed effects and hospital-agency pair
fixed effects for the vertical integration specification. The hospital-level fixed effects makes
two comparisons: first, it compares the patients going to the VI agency to those going to
any other agency from the same hospital, and second, it compares patients going to an
agency before and after a change in integration status during the study’s time period. This
second variation is the sole defining variation for the pair fixed effect.
Specifically, the results from the pair fixed effects are driven by the integration or disintegration of agencies with hospitals over the time period, which is similar to a difference-indifferences construction. The estimate of interest compares recertification rates of specific
hospital-HHA pairs before and after (dis)integration to pairs that do not change integration
status (the controls), while still accounting for general year trends and patient observables.
The identifying variation is from the change in integration status of hospitals and agencies
over the time period in question. Figure 6 shows this variation in two ways— on the left,
it shows the change in percent of VI in an HRR over time, and on the right, it shows the
change in percent of VI hospitals over time. This fixed effect controls for any unobservable,
time-invariant relationship between hospital and agency. This has the added advantage of
removing any unobservable differences across providers in treatment patterns for patients,
in quality of care at the hospital level, or in potential selection on hospitals by patients. For
example, if an agency-hospital pair has high quality and low recertification rates over the
entire time period and they decide to integrate midway through the time period, the effect
of unobservable quality is swept out of the model and the effect of VI on recertification
measured by the model is will not be biased by this time-invariant quality. However it does
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not control for any time-variant changes that may coincide with the integration change.
Figure 6: Variation in Integration over time

This figure plots the change in percent of hospitals that are vertically integrated in an HRR to show
that there is significant variation and change in HRR-level vertical integration percentage. On the
right, the graph shows the change in percent of hospitals integrated with a home health agency over
the time period of the data.

One potential concern often raised is hospitals cherry-picking healthier patients to send
to their integrated agencies. This was a commonly raised issue after the introduction of
the hospital PPS, introduced theoretically by Ellis and McGuire (1996) (though empirical
evidence has been mixed, with Dafny (2005), among hospitals, and Swanson (2013), among
physician owners, not finding strong evidence of such). First it is worth noting that this
story should be controlled for using the IV strategy. The instrument used in the paper
randomizes patients to both the VI hospital and the VI agency based on relative distances.
So this assigns the patient to a VI agency if they live near a VI hospital and not based on
severity, thus getting around the issue stated.
However, the issue may still be present in hospital or pair-level FE’s. Hospitals may choose
healthier patients that are more profitable and need less HHA care to send to their own
agency. In robustness checks, I first consider if all of the VI effect is removed when looking
at non-VI hospitals using an integrated agency. Second, I consider just the population
of patients with a primary diagnosis of AMI that use an agency within 30 miles of their
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residence, which is a much more balanced population on observables. Being within 30 miles
of the hospital removes potential patient selection to the hospital, and using AMI patients,
a more emergent population suffering from an acute ailment, reduces the dimensions on
which hospitals could ‘cherry-pick’. Further, I use a matched sample using Coarsened Exact
Matching technique (Iacus et al. 2012) within VI hospitals, matching non-VI agency patients
to VI agency patients, to examine potential cherry-picking as an alternative explanation. I
also consider the effect of just the vertically integrated hospital and just the agency (not
both together) to rule out that the VI effect is actually measuring a provider effect and not
a coordination or system effect.
I show results for the effect of VI on recertification rate under the following fixed effects:
HRR and HSA (both simple OLS and the IV discussed above), hospital, and hospitalagency pair (often called Pair FE in the specifications). The most favored specifications are
the HRR IV and the Pair FE for the removal of unobservable patient severity biases and
provider-level endogeneity, selectively.
2.2.3. Identifying causal effects of competition
For market structure endogeneity, the concerns are that the competition level is determined
by the demand for HHA services by Medicare patients on unobservables such as quality of
HHA and that the traditional measure of competition is biased when using actual patient
flows. While I define HHI at the agency level, which avoids the common measurement
error found by defining discrete market boundaries (such as within HRRs), it may still be
endogenous as to why an agency is participating in one zipcode but not a neighboring one.
Furthermore, using actual patient flows to measure competition may be a symptom of the
competitive process themselves; this can lead to correlations in unobservable patient outcomes and the competitiveness of the HHA used. To name one example, actual patient flows
may inflate the concentration of integrated agencies since they receive large percentages of
their patients from one hospital.
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To address this, I follow the strategy used in Kessler and McClellan (2000) and calculate
an predicted patient flows based only on exogenous determinants such as distance using
a discrete choice model of home health agency choice. These patient flows are then used
to calculate exogenously-determined agency-specific person-weighted HHI’s. Like Cooper
et al. (2011), I use a Poisson regression on aggregate zip code-level flows, which generates
equivalent coefficients and covariances as the conditional logit but is much simpler to compute (Guimaraes et al. 2003). I estimate the predicted patient flows using percentiles of
differential distance between nearest HHA with the same characteristics as the one chosen
and differential distance between nearest HHA with the opposite characteristics as the one
chosen. Note that these distances are based on distances between the referring hospital and
the set of agencies the patient faces within 100 miles. Since the hospital has a significant
amount of influence when referring patients to agencies and relationships are formed between hospital and agency, I believe that this distance is more relevant than the distance
between patient home and agency. This is particularly true as the patient is not incurring
the travel cost in home health care, but the hospital relationship is likely to depend on
closeness to agencies.
This estimation strategy hinges on the idea that differential distances from the center of
the hospital’s zipcode to the HHA office is not correlated with any unobservable reasons for
selecting an HHA that may also be related to recertification. I believe it is reasonable that
distance is exogenous as hospital locations tend to be historically driven and static. The
identifying variation stems from three areas: changes over time across areas in markets due
to openings, closing, and mergers of agencies, changes over time in hospital preferences of
the agency characteristics used in the model, and changes in the distribution of hospitals
using home health agency services following an acute care stay. Over the time period, there
were over 4,000 agencies that enter the market and 2,300 that exit. This represents a net
of approximately 800 for-profit agencies and a decrease of 400 not-for-profit or government
agencies total.
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Specifically, the indirect expected utility of a hospital h from choosing to refer patients to
z+
z−
HHA j is u∗hj , which is the sum of the relative distances, DDhj
, DDhj
, based on agency’s

characteristics z ∈ Z; the actual distance Dhj ; and an error term εhj , which is assumed
to be independently and identically distributed (iid), Type I extreme value, and captures
the unobserved attributes of the patient’s choice proxied through the hospital attended.
The concerns of independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) from the iid assumption are
mitigated from the use of individual data and substantial variation across individuals and
agencies that is captured by the distance variables. Like Kessler and McClellan (2000),
I categorize the differential distances into four indicator variables by tenth, twenty-fifth,
and fiftieth percentiles of distance, and I allow for different impact depending on whether
the agency characteristic is 1 or 0. For example, for profit status, the parameter varies
on whether the agency is a for-profit (P = 1) or not-for-profit (P = 0). The estimation
equation is:

uhj =

X


z+
z−
DDhj
· (θ1 zj + θ2 (1 − zj )) + DDhj
· (θ3 zj + θ4 (1 − zj )) + θ5 Dhj + εhj ,

z∈Z

where z ∈ {profit status, vertical integration, staff size}.
Each estimation is done separately by year using a 50% sample, and as an alternative
specification, I also estimate separate models for 10 geographic regions5 in addition to
the entire U.S. This has the added benefit of allowing for different preferences (and thus
parameter estimates) for different geographic regions. This HHI is referenced as “Agency
HHI (Regional)” as opposed to just “Agency HHI (Exog.)”, which does not have separate
regional parameters. For more detailed information on the calculation of HHI variable from
the predicted probabilities of each patient from hospital h, zip-code k choosing home health
5

The ten regions are: 1- CT, ME, NH, RI, VT, MA; 2- NJ, New York-White Plains-Wayne, NY-NJ,
Philadelphia, PA, Allentown-Bethlehem-Easton, PA-NJ, and Newark-Union, NJ-PA CBSA’s; 3- Remainder
of NY and PA; 4-DE, DC, FL, GA, MD, NC, SC, VA, and WV; 5-IN, OH, IL, MI, WI; 6- AL, KY, MS, and
TN; 7-IA, KS, MN, MO, NE, ND, and SD; 8-AR, LA, OK, and TX; 9-AZ, CO, ID, MT, NV, NM, UT, and
WY; 10-OR, WA, and all of CA.
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agency j, please refer to the Appendix section A.1.3.
For the competition specification, I show results with and without HSA market fixed effects.
The results comparing across markets may have a greater degree of variation on which to
identify. However, there may be concerns about unobserved market differences that impact
the market’s level of competition or patterns of post-acute care use, which may be alleviated
with market fixed effects. These results are less powered due to a smaller degree of variation
within these (smaller) markets over time. I am also more interested in the effect of changing
levels of patient flow within a market, as the profit pressures felt by an agency likely does
not depend on the absolute HHI level, but the relative HHI measure as compared to itself
over time and across firms within the local market. I use the HSA definition for the market
as these generally outline continuous localities within which driving distances for agencies to
patients are reasonable; outside of a drivable radius, relevant competition between agencies
will be greatly reduced.
2.2.4. Secondary outcomes: spending and readmissions
Of importance is not only the effect on recertifications but also the effect on Medicare
spending and outcomes—the welfare impacts— and in particular, the effect due to additional recertifications. Results on Medicare spending matter because “efficiency” in this
context is from the perspective of society or all taxpayers who fund Medicare. While the
patient may be receiving a non-negative benefit for no personal out-of-pocket cost, efficient
care should be determined by whether the money Medicare pays for the care is worth the
benefit provided to the patient. If there are no improvements on outcomes for each new
episode paid, then the additional recertifications are not evident of high-value care.
In this paper, I measure spending in three main ways. First, I consider the inpatient cost
of the patient’s index admission; second, I consider the cost of the total home health care,
including the initial episode and all subsequent recertifications connected to that initial
episode; and third, I consider the total cost of care including the inpatient admission, all
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home health episodes, and any 30-day readmissions that may have occurred. I use logged
spending in each of these cases as health care spending is notoriously right-skewed, and I use
OLS to measure these, which should provide consistent coefficients and underestimating the
standard errors should not change the conclusions significantly given such a large dataset.
However, I also run a generalized linear moments (GLM) model with a log-link and gamma
family (see Appendix Table B.7).
I use readmissions as the main proxy for patient outcomes. A common measure for quality
is mortality; however, the population of home health users does not have a high rate of
mortality as it is often seen as the least severe setting amongst post-acute care facilities,
and therefore, would not be high-enough powered to use as a proxy for outcomes. The main
specifications on readmissions use 30-day readmissions because of the additional attention
placed on 30 days following the passage of the Hospital Readmissions Reduction Program
(HRRP) in 2010, which penalizes hospitals financially for excess readmissions during that
timeframe. If there were any margin on which agencies were measured for their quality,
it would be this one. However, since a recertification would occur at 60-days, I also run
robustness checks on the effect on readmission rates at 60 and 90-days.
Finally, to find the causal effect on spending and readmissions due to changes in recertification rates stemming from vertical integration or competition, I use two-stage least squares
(2SLS) with VI or competition as instruments for recertification rate. That is, the first stage
is the impact of VI or HHI on recertification, and the second stage measures the impact on
spending or readmissions from additional recertifications deriving from VI or HHI changes.
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CHAPTER 3 : Empirical Analysis and Results
In the section, I present descriptive analysis from raw data plots showing the patterns between home health agency concentration, vertical integration and recertification rates. I
present preliminary regression results, which will help describe magnitudes of the relationships while controlling for patient, provider, and market characteristics. Then I present
causal results utilizing the instruments described in the empirical strategy section. I also
show results on secondary outcomes of interest—spending and readmissions. Finally, I finish with work on mechanisms through event studies and on Medicare Advantage influence
on competition.

3.1. Descriptive Analysis
Figure 7a: Distribution of Recertification

Figure 7b: Distribution of HHA Concentra-

Rates by VI

tions at Agency Level

Figure 7a shows the distribution of recertification rates by vertical integration (VI). It can be seen
that the recertification rates are not being driven by outliers of agencies recertifying extremely high
percentages of their patients. Figure 7b shows the demeaned distribution of HHA competition (as
measured by the zip-weighted Herfindahl–Hirschman index Index). It shows that the distribution is
long tailed among concentrated agencies. These graphs do not include agencies with fewer than ten
patients per year.

Figure 7a plots a histogram of recertification rate by agency, split by vertical integration
status. It is clear from the histogram that the distribution of recertification rates is smooth
and the recertification rate itself is not driven by any particular group of agencies with very
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high rates. Further, the histogram shows that non-integrated agencies have recertification
rates that are more broadly distributed and right-tailed while integrated agencies are heavily
clustered around 15%. The distribution of HHA concentration is interesting. Figure 7b
shows that the spread of above-average (greater than zero in the figure) concentration is
broad and wide-ranging, while agencies with above-average competitiveness cluster closely
with one another.
The main results can be summarized well using two plots. First, Figure 8 demonstrates that
as concentration decreases (i.e., competition increases), the recertification rate increases at
an exponential rate, and particularly so when concentration goes below average (less than
zero in the plot). Moreover, this pattern is only present for the non-integrated only, whereas
the average recertification rate for integrated agencies does not vary as concentration index
changes1 .
This suggests VI agencies are subjected less to competitive pressures to hold onto patients
or their costs for obtaining new patients are much lower. On the other hand, non-integrated
entities are greatly affected by the competitiveness of their market and choose to recertify
more when there is reduced patient flow to their agency. At high concentrations, neither
integrated nor non-integrated agency feels similar pressure to maintain nonzero profits and
should therefore have similar recertification rates.
An important resultant question is whether fewer recertifications lead to worse outcomes,
such as a readmission at the hospital. Figure 9, created in the same manner, previews
evidence that there is no significant pattern of readmission rate with changing HHA concentrations. There is not apparent evidence that relatively lower rates at more concentrated
levels leads to worse patient outcomes as measured by readmissions.
However, it is hard to draw strong conclusions from these plots which only use crosssectional raw data and does not control for any potential selection biases, omitted variables,
1
Note that each point in the graph is the average recertification rate of all agencies at that HHI level
(rounded to 0.001), excluding any concentration level with less than 10 observations to reduce noise.
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Figure 8: Recertification Rates by HHA Concentration: Separated by vertical integration

This graph shows the raw recertification rate, averaged over all agencies over a 0.001 band of HHI
(which is demeaned), separated by vertically integrated and non-vertically integrated agencies. The
recertification rate increases exponentially for non-vertically integrated agencies that are at above
average levels of competition (or below zero on the x-axis).

Figure 9: Readmission Rates by HHA Concentration: Separated by vertical integration

Using same methodology as above, this graph shows the average readmission rate of agencies within
a 0.0001 band of HHI (which is demeaned). The readmission rate does not demonstrate similar
changes over the range of HHI for either VI or non-VI agencies.
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or measurement errors. The regression analyses described below will incorporate methods
to control for these, but, spoiler alert, the reader will find that not only do the results stay
consistent with the raw plots but they are further supported by the event studies showing
a substantial drop in recertification rates following integration both within HRR level and
also at the pair FE level, described in the later section 3.4.1.

3.2. Regression Analysis on Recertifications
I focus on the effect of vertical integration on recertification rates separate from competition
effects first (though each is controlled for in the other specification), then I show that there
is an interactive effect between the two. Then I will discuss results focusing on secondary
outcomes.
3.2.1. Results from vertical integration
Table 4 shows the relationship between vertical integration with recertification rates using
two market-level fixed effects and instrumental variables to control for patient severity endogeneity. Columns (1) and (2) provide the simple OLS regression results, showing that
vertical integration is negatively associated with higher recertification rates, reducing recertification rates by 4.37-5.74 percentage points. These, however, are not causal estimates,
which are provided in (5) and (6) by instrumenting for vertical integration using the differential distance to the nearest vertically integrated versus non-integrated hospital with
market fixed effects (both at the HSA and HRR levels).
Columns (3) and (4) show a strong first stage; that is, the closer the vertically integrated
hospital relative to the non-integrated hospital is the more likely the patient will go to the
vertically-integrated hospital and agency. The coefficient suggests that for every log-mile
difference, the patient is more likely to go to the VI Hospital by 1.9 to 8.1 percentage
points. The F-statistics are extremely large— 203.47 and 385.13 for HSA and HRR FE’s
respectively. The IV results are shown in columns (5) and (6). The results demonstrate
that attending a vertically-integrated hospital and agency has reduces the likelihood of
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recertification rates by 3.39 to 3.63 percentage points. This estimate is a slight decline
from the OLS regressions, which is likely due to unobservably sicker patients sorting into
vertically integrated systems, which is believable since observably sicker patients were in the
VI systems (per Summary Table 1). However, the change in coefficient is overall not very
big—in fact, running an endogeneity test shows that vertical integration is not a statistically
significant endogenous regressor (F-statistic is 1.253 and the chi-square p-value is 0.2631) 2 .
Overall, the impact of vertical integration on recertification rates is large—3.39 percentage
points is a reduction of over 22% on an average of 15% recertifications—and very statistically
significant (p-value < 0.001) under HRR FE’s. This is the preferred market level to consider
because the HSA boundaries are too small; many HSA’s only contain one or two hospitals,
making comparisons within HSA very difficult.
Table 4: Vertical Integration effect on Any Recertification (Instrumental Variable approach)

Vert. Int.

(1)
HSA OLS
b/se
-0.0574∗∗∗
(0.003)

(2)
HRR OLS
b/se
-0.0437∗∗∗
(0.004)

Diff. Distance
Patient Cntrl
Hosp & HHA Ctrl
Market Ctrl
N
r2 adj.
F stat

Yes
Yes
Yes
5888259
0.1289

Yes
Yes
Yes
5888259
0.1362

(3)
HSA FS
b/se

(4)
HRR FS
b/se

-0.0195∗∗∗
(0.001)
Yes
Yes
Yes
5888254
0.0352

-0.0814∗∗∗
(0.004)
Yes
Yes
Yes
5888254
0.0901

(5)
IV HSA
b/se
-0.0363∗
(0.018)

(6)
IV HRR
b/se
-0.0339∗∗∗
(0.009)

Yes
Yes
Yes
5888137
0.1282
203.47

Yes
Yes
Yes
5888254
0.1361
385.13

All regressions are robust SE and clustered at the fixed effects (FE) level indicated by column headers.
The dependent variable is probability of recertification (0/1 dummy). The instrument used is differential
distance, or the distance from patient zip centroid to nearest vertically integrated hospital minus distance
to nearest non-integrated hospital. FS shows the first stage results. Patient controls include demographics,
comorbidities, risk factors; hospital and HHA controls include profit status, teaching status, bed size, and
rural/urban; and market controls include percent of market over age 65, number of long term care beds, and
hospital concentration index. HRR is a hospital referral region and HSA is a hospital service area.

Table 5 shows the provider-level fixed effects specifications without controls and then again
with the array of individual, provider, and market-level controls. These provider fixed effects sweep out unobservable time-invariant omitted variable bias regarding the relationship
2

This is using the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test.
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Table 5: Vertical Integration effect on Any Recertification (Provider-level FEs)

Vert. Int.
Patient Cntrl
Hosp & HHA Ctrl
Market Ctrl
HH Agency HHI (Exog.)
N
r2 a

(1)
Hospital
b/se
-0.0948∗∗∗
(0.006)
No
No
No
No
5916927
0.0056

(2)
Hospital
b/se
-0.0434∗∗∗
(0.003)
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
5888259
0.1279

(3)
Pair
b/se
-0.0441∗∗∗
(0.008)
No
No
No
No
5916927
0.0010

(4)
Pair
b/se
-0.0396∗∗∗
(0.006)
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
5888259
0.0997

All regressions are robust SE and clustered at the fixed effects (FE) level indicated by column headers. The
dependent variable is probability of recertification (0/1 dummy). ‘Pair’ FE means within a hospital-agency
pair. Patient controls include demographics, comorbidities, risk factors; hospital and HHA controls include
profit status, teaching status, bed size, and rural/urban; and market controls include percent of market over
age 65, number of long term care beds, and hospital concentration index.

or specific practice patterns between the hospital or the hospital and agency. Without controls, patients attending the integrated agency have a 9.48 percentage point decrease in
probability of recertification; however, with controls, this estimate only becomes 4.34 percentage points. However, the general stability of the pair fixed effects after adding controls
suggests that the pair FE does a better job controlling for selection on observables and
likely on unobservables as well, if we extrapolate that selection on unobservables share similar covariance properties. The coefficient only varies slightly from -0.0441 to -0.0396 while
accompanied by a significant increase in the R-squared, which decreases the potential contribution of unobservables (Oster 2014). Furthermore, the VI coefficient across various fixed
effect models and compared to the IV results is very stable suggests that the provider-level
endogeneity may not be a large concern with the array of controls. The results range from
-3.43 (HRR FEs under IV) to -4.34 percentage points (Hospital FEs under OLS), though
the most preferable specifications are the HRR IV FEs (-3.39, p < 0.001) and the Pair FEs
(-3.96, p < 0.001) 3 .
The large difference in the coefficient for hospital fixed effects following the addition of
3
This may lead one to wonder what kind of variation is there between versus within these FE’s. I have
described this variation in the Appendix section A.1.4.
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controls (a 54% drop) suggests that there is significant patient selection to the integrated
agency within hospital, or “cherry-picking” of patients. I dive deeper into exploring potential
cherry-picking in the next subsection.
3.2.2. Selection on observables & cherry picking
There is often a concern of selection on health when patient treatment or care can be directed
by a provider (i.e., Ellis and McGuire 1986). Here it’s possible that integrated hospitals are
purposefully referring certain types of patients towards their own integrated agency—likely,
these would be healthier patients that may need shorter lengths care or healthier patients
within their HHRG categories which would be more profitable 4 . I explore this further in
three ways. First, I look at patients coming from a non-integrated hospital going to an
integrated agency (owned by a different hospital) to see if the effect is limited to a hospital
“cherry-picking” patients or if the agency treats (non-cherry picked) patients from another
hospital similarly. Second, I take only acute myocardial infarction (AMI) patients living
within 30 miles of the hospital, which is a subset that is well balanced on observable severity.
If we assume that the unobserved selection is the same as the selection on observables, we
may also think that the results are less influenced by selection on unobservables under
these circumstances (Altonji et al. 2005, Oster 2014). Finally, I also match patients that
go to an integrated agency to patients that go to an unintegrated agency from integrated
hospitals using a Coarsened Exact Matching technique (Iacus et al. 2012), thus removing
any observable differences between VI and non-VI patients with VI hospitals. This removes
the possibility of cherry picking based on observables (to the econometrician, at least).
Table 6 demonstrates the AMI patients that use an agency within 30 miles are a much more
balanced sample on observables, removing observable selection and hopefully unobservable
selection. By selecting patients living within 30 miles of a hospital reduces the probability of
4
The instrumental variable of differential distance fulfills the exclusion criteria even at the agency level
since it randomizes patients to VI hospitals and agencies based on relative distance to hospitals. The hospital
does not play a role in selecting these patients to agencies. The concern addressed here is more related to
the hospital-level fixed effects.
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hospital selection due to the emergent nature of AMI’s—they cannot select which hospital to
attend due to unobservable sickness or severity. Furthermore, the close proximity increases
likelihood of these patients having similar agency choice and using the same agency. With
this sample, the differences in unobservables and the probability of distance to agency
hopefully play a smaller role in the recertification rate.
Table 6: Summary statistics by Vertical Integration of AMI patients Attending VI Hospital
within 30 miles
Male
Race: White
Race: Black
Race: Hispanic
Race: Other
Age
Charlson Index
Num. of Risk Factors
Case Mix
LOS
Readmissions
Miles to Hosp
Any Recert.
Observations

Non-VI Agency
0.4549
0.8779
0.0774
0.0114
0.0332
80.1076
2.8961
3.1202
1.2733
7.0217
0.2222
15.3415
0.1890
33327

VI Agency
0.4607
0.8926
0.0732
0.0107
0.0235
80.8170
2.9184
3.1398
1.1024
6.8931
0.2202
7.0312
0.0802

Diff.
-0.0058
-0.0146∗∗∗
0.0042
0.0007
0.0097∗∗∗
-0.7094∗∗∗
-0.0223
-0.0196
0.1710∗∗∗
0.1286∗
0.0020
8.3103∗∗∗
0.1088∗∗∗

T-stat
-0.9878
-3.9210
1.3526
0.5821
5.1029
-7.0254
-1.1755
-1.2285
26.0603
2.2949
0.4114
62.7066
29.2612

This table shows person-level characteristics of the sub-sample of patients that attend a vertically integrated
(VI) hospital within 30 miles. It compares the difference in characteristics of those attending a VI agency or
not from a VI hospital. LOS is the inpatient length of stay. The Charlson Index is a measure of comorbidities,
and risk factors are the sum of risk factors as categorized by the Hierarchical Condition Categories designated
by CMS.

Table 7, columns (1) and (2), shows the results of a patient attending a VI agency from a
non-integrated hospital. The results are still significant and negative, albeit of smaller magnitude where attending a VI agency even reduces recertification rates for outside patients
by 1.43-1.60 percentage points. This makes sense since they are still constraining capacity
and resources, leading the agency to less motivated to retain them for longer episodes. It
is clear that the main VI effect is not solely from cherry-picking from VI hospitals.
The results for subsamples balanced on observables are shown in Table 7, with the AMI
population shown in columns (3)-(6) and the matched sample in column (7). Both (6) and
(7) are subset to patients discharged from a VI hospital, so the identifying variation comes
from patients attending a VI or non-VI agency — the potential cherry-picking margin.
We see that the results from the full sample persist for the AMI population; estimates for
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Table 7: Vertical Integration effect on Any Recertification: Cherry Picking
Non-VI Hospitals
(1)
(2)
Hosp FE
HRR FE
b/se
b/se
Vert. Int. System
Vert. Int. Agency
Patient Cntrl
Hosp & HHA Ctrl
Market Ctrl
N
r2 adj.

-0.0160∗∗∗
(0.005)
Yes
Yes
Yes
2113023
0.1248

-0.0143∗∗∗
(0.005)
Yes
Yes
Yes
2113023
0.1374

AMI Population, <30 miles
(4)
(5)
(6)
Pair FE
HRR FE VI Hosp. only
b/se
b/se
b/se
-0.0427∗∗∗ -0.0415∗∗∗
(0.012)
(0.005)
-0.0489∗∗∗
(0.007)
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
109244
109244
33327
0.0624
0.0999
0.1056

(3)
Hosp FE
b/se
-0.0414∗∗∗
(0.005)

Yes
Yes
Yes
109244
0.0925

Matched Sample
(7)
VI Hosp. only
b/se

-0.0597∗∗∗
(0.006)
Yes
Yes
Yes
20950
0.0278

All regressions are robust SE, clustered at HRR (hospital referral region). FE are at the levels indicated by column headers. The
dependent variable is probability of recertification (0/1 dummy). Non-VI Hospitals, (1) & (2), indicates patients were discharged
from a non-VI hospital only. Columns (3-6) show only AMI (acute myocardial infarction patients) living less than 30 miles away
from the hospital attended. ‘VI Hosp. only’ (6) includes only patients attending VI hospitals, thus identifying variation is between
patients attending VI agencies and non-VI agencies. Matched Sample (7) is a subset of patients matched between attending a VI
agency and non-VI agency from a VI hospital, using the Coarsened Exact Matching method. Vert. Int. System indicates patients
attending both a VI hospital and the agency it owns; Vert. Int. Agency equals one for patients who attended an an agency owned
by a hospital.

the impact of vertical integration (hospital and agency) are similar to that of the whole
population, about -4.14 to -4.27 percentage points. Even when looking at the potential
cherry-picked sample, we find that the estimates do not vary much. In fact, they show a
greater relationship between vertical integration and lower recertification rates, a decrease
of 4.89-5.97 percentage points. These estimates are also very close to the estimates from
our preferred Pair FE’s and HRR FE with IV models. This provides more support for the
result that vertical integration decreases recertification rates, regardless of patient severity,
any potential cherry picking, or provider endogeneity.
3.2.3. Results from competition, alone, and interacted with vertical integration
Results from regressions on various definitions of home health agency concentrations are
shown in Table 8. Recall that the agency HHI is calculated using a weighted average of
actual patient flows while the two exogenous HHI’s are estimated using conditional logit
models5 . A one standard deviation increase in the agency’s concentration leads to a -0.28
to -2.48 percentage point decrease in the recertification rate. The smallest coefficient is
the effect measured using the regional exogenous HHI under HSA FE; it is likely that the
5

More model details can be found in section 2.2.2
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additional regional flexibility for the taste parameters used in the regional HHI soaks up
much of definition variation remaining within the HSA. Thus the effect from the preferred
specification is -0.78 for the (non-regional) exogenous HHI6 . To put some real numbers to it,
a 1,733 change in HHI is equivalent to a duopoly market becoming an evenly split three-firm
market, which would lead to a 0.86 percentage point decrease in recertification rate, or a
5.6% change from the average recertification rate of 15.4%.

7

Table 8: Effect of HHA Concentration on Any Recertification: Using Various HHI Definitions

Agency HHI (Wt. Avg.)

(1)
No FE
b/se
-0.1547∗∗∗
(0.020)

(2)
No FE
b/se

(4)
FE
b/se
-0.1338∗∗∗
(0.023)

-0.0789∗∗∗
(0.016)

Agency HHI (Exog.)
Agency HHI (Reg.)
N
r2 adj.
Mean value
1 SD ∆ (pp)

(3)
No FE
b/se

5888259
0.1668
0.310
-2.48

5888259
0.1642
0.153
-1.22

(5)
FE
b/se

(6)
FE
b/se

-0.0500∗∗∗
(0.015)
-0.1185∗∗∗
(0.016)
5888259
0.1653
0.155
-1.81

5886990
0.1281
0.310
-2.14

5886990
0.1279
0.153
-0.78

-0.0182
(0.015)
5886990
0.1279
0.155
-0.28

All regressions are robust SE, clustered at HSA (hospital service area) level. The dependent variable is
probability of recertification (0/1 dummy). Agency HHI (Wt. Avg) is the agency-specific weighted average
of zip-level HHI’s. (Exog) is the predicted HHI estimated through conditional logit model of patient flow, and
(Regional Exog) allows for greater geographic flexibility for the taste parameters using 10 separate models
grouped by geographic area. See section 2.2.2 for more details. Patient (demographics, comorbidities, risk
factors), hospital, agency (profit, urban, size, teaching), and market (percent over age 65, number of long
term care beds, hospital concentration) controls are included. Fixed effects (FE) are at the agency’s HSA
level when indicated (columns 4-6).

As Bresnahan and Levin (2012) reminds us, firm structure and market structure do not
interact independently of each other. The functionality of vertical integration may differ
based on the structure of the market, or vertical integration itself may change the competitive landscape. For example, a VI agency whose patients are predominantly referred by
the acquiring hospital may be insulated from any new entrants or increasing competition
for other hospitals’ patients. Table 9 supports this notion, where the coefficient on HHI is
6
HSA fixed effects control for time-invariant heterogeneity across markets and providers, thus allowing
the identification to come from changes in the market over time.
7
I have also tried to use brand fixed effects, changes in ownership through mergers or acquisitions, and
certificate of need laws for exogenous variation on competition. I discuss these efforts in the Appendix
Section A.1.5.
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almost equal but opposite in magnitude to the coefficient on the interaction (Vert. Int. ×
Agency HHI), canceling each other out as HHI changes. This means that only for non-VI
systems does concentration affect recertifications (significant at p < 0.001 and negative),
mirroring the raw results plotted in Figure 8.
Table 9: Vertical Integration X Competition effect on Any Recertification

Vert. Int. (VI)
Agency HHI (Wt. Avg)
VI × Agency HHI (Wt. Avg)

(1)
Base
b/se
-0.0784∗∗∗
(0.006)
-0.2436∗∗∗
(0.034)
0.2284∗∗∗
(0.025)

(2)
Exog HHI
b/se
-0.0621∗∗∗
(0.005)

(3)
Exog HHI (Reg.)
b/se
-0.0630∗∗∗
(0.005)

-0.0880∗∗∗
(0.017)
0.1024∗∗∗
(0.024)

Agency HHI (Exog)
VI × Agency HHI (Exog)

-0.0625∗∗∗
(0.017)
0.1466∗∗∗
(0.025)
No
No
No
5906422
0.0038
0.155
1.28
-0.96

VI × Agency HHI (Regional Exog)
No
No
No
5906422
0.0048
0.310
-0.23
-3.90

(5)
Exog HHI
b/se
-0.0475∗∗∗
(0.004)

(6)
Exog HHI (Reg.)
b/se
-0.0483∗∗∗
(0.004)

-0.0705∗∗∗
(0.015)
0.0502∗∗
(0.018)

Agency HHI (Regional Exog)

Patient Cntrl
Hosp & HHA Ctrl
Market Ctrl
N
r2 adj.
Mean HHI value
1 SD ∆ in HHI for VI (pp)
1 SD ∆ in HHI for non-VI (pp)

(4)
Base
b/se
-0.0344∗∗∗
(0.004)
-0.0936∗∗∗
(0.022)
0.0824∗∗∗
(0.017)

No
No
No
5906422
0.0037
0.153
0.22
-1.36

Yes
Yes
Yes
5898267
0.1304
0.310
-0.18
-1.50

Yes
Yes
Yes
5898267
0.1279
0.153
-0.31
-1.09

-0.0477∗∗
(0.015)
0.0832∗∗∗
(0.018)
Yes
Yes
Yes
5898267
0.1280
0.155
0.54
-0.73

All regressions are robust SE, clustered at HSA (hospital service area) level. The dependent variable is probability of recertification
(0/1 dummy). Agency HHI (Wt. Avg), in the Base specifications, is the agency-specific weighted average of zip-level HHI’s. (Exog)
is the predicted HHI estimated through conditional logit model of patient flow, and (Regional Exog) allows for greater geographic
flexibility for the taste parameters using 10 separate models grouped by geographic area. See section 2.2.2 for more details.
Patient (demographics, comorbidities, risk factors), hospital, agency (profit, urban, size, teaching), and market (percent over age
65, number of long term care beds, hospital concentration) controls are included. Fixed effects (FE) are at the agency’s HSA
level.

VI systems have persistent lower recertification rates by -4.75 percentage points (for my
preferred specification using exogenous HHI and HSA fixed effects), and for each standard
deviation increase of HHI, this rate changes by only -0.31 percentage points. However, for
a non-integrated system, the recertification rate changes by -1.09 percentage points (more
than three times the amount) for each standard deviation increase in HHI.
This is further reinforced with a full interaction of VI and HHI shown in Table 10. For
only VI patients, changes in HHI does not statistical significance on recertifications; for
non-VI patients, a standard deviation increase in HHI leads to a -1.05 to -2.17 percentage
point change on recertification rates. To sum, both tables show that concentration has no
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Table 10: Full interaction of Vertical Integration X Competition effect on Any Recertification
(1)
VI
b/se
0.0221
(0.032)
0.0005
0.35

(2)
Not VI
b/se
-0.2195∗∗∗
(0.033)
0.0011
-3.27

(3)
VI
b/se
0.0047
(0.024)
0.0880
0.07

(4)
Not VI
b/se
-0.1458∗∗∗
(0.023)
0.1295
-2.17

r2 adj.
1SD ∆ (pp)

0.0342
(0.028)
0.0005
0.52

-0.0756∗∗∗
(0.017)
0.0011
-1.15

0.0087
(0.018)
0.0881
0.13

-0.0694∗∗∗
(0.015)
0.1317
-1.05

Patient Cntrl
Hosp & HHA Ctrl
Market Ctrl
N

No
No
No
1029098

No
No
No
4877324

Yes
Yes
Yes
1027347

Yes
Yes
Yes
4870920

Agency HHI (Wt. Avg)
r2 adj.
1SD ∆ (pp)
Agency HHI (Exog)

All regressions are robust SE, clustered at HSA (hospital service area) level with
HSA fixed effects. The dependent variable is probability of recertification (0/1
dummy). VI represents patients receiving care at vertically integrated systems.
Agency HHI (Wt. Avg) is the agency-specific weighted average of zip-level HHI’s.
(Exog) is the predicted HHI estimated through conditional logit model of patient
flow, and (Regional Exog) allows for greater geographic flexibility for the taste
parameters using 10 separate models grouped by geographic area. See section
2.2.2 for more details. Patient (demographics, comorbidities, risk factors), hospital, agency (profit, urban, size, teaching), and market (percent over age 65,
number of long term care beds, hospital concentration) controls are included.
1SD ∆ change shows the percentage point change in recertification rate for one
standard deviation change in HHI.
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impact on recertifications for VI patients, and the effect of concentration on recertifications
is stronger for non-VI patients than when looking at all patients together.

3.3. Regression Analysis on Secondary Outcomes
The impact of additional recertifications on Medicare dollars and on patient outcomes,
specifically readmissions, is essential for understanding whether the recertifications can be
considered low-value care. Tables 11 and 12 show the impact on log Medicare spending at
both the post-acute and inpatient levels8 . The results show that VI reflects overall total
savings, which includes inpatient, readmission and HHA costs, in a patient’s care continuum
(assuming no other stays outside of the hospital or HHA) of 5.78% using IV method within
HRR, or 1.38% in savings using the Pair FE method. These savings are driven by savings
in the HHA setting as VI has very little to no effect on inpatient spending. In the inpatient
setting, costs of the index admission are 4.03% less than non-VI patients (about $451), after
controlling for unobservable severity within an HRR, or when comparing at the hospitalagency pair fixed effect level, the VI impact is essentially zero, at 0.8% difference (not
statistically significant).
Panel B shows the total home health spending, which includes all home health episodes
following any index inpatient stay. Because the regression controls for HHRG diagnosis,
these savings should derive from additional episodes with limited impact from greater intensity of episode. We see from these tables that vertical integration is associated with
savings at the home health level from reduced recertifications, ranging from 6.84%, about
$239, (IV result) to 5.06%, or $177, (hospital FE) in savings. The average spending for
a home health total episode is $3500, so 5-6.8% is still a substantial percentage deriving
simply from recertification differences between VI and non-VI systems. These savings do
not seem to have an impact on readmissions outcomes (seen in Panel C ), implying that the
increased recertifications under non-VI entities is not accompanied with better outcomes.
8

Running a GLM regression with a log-link and gamma family (see Appendix Table B.7) shows that the
coefficients are similar
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Table 11: Effect of Vertical Integration on Inpatient and HHA Spending and Readmissions
(1)
(2)
(3)
HRR FE
HRR IV Hospital FE
b/se
b/se
b/se
A. Log Total Spending (mean: $15,430)
Vert. Int. -0.0420∗∗∗ -0.0578∗∗∗
-0.0440∗∗∗
(0.004)
(0.012)
(0.003)
r2 adj.
0.5004
0.5003
0.4880
B. Log Inpatient Spending (mean: $10,500)
Vert. Int. -0.0172∗∗
-0.0403∗∗
0.0000
(0.005)
(0.014)
(0.001)
r2 adj.
0.7853
0.7851
0.7880

(4)
Pair FE
b/se

(5)
HHA FE
b/se

-0.0138∗∗
(0.005)
0.4823

-0.0233∗∗∗
(0.005)
0.4998

0.0080
(0.005)
0.7821

-0.0140∗
(0.006)
0.7860

C. Log Total Home Health Spending (mean: $3,500)
Vert. Int. -0.0725∗∗∗ -0.0684∗∗∗
-0.1125∗∗∗
-0.0506∗∗∗
(0.007)
(0.017)
(0.007)
(0.011)
r2 adj.
0.2242
0.2241
0.2184
0.1967
D. Readmissions (Mean:
Vert. Int.
-0.0006
(0.001)
r2 adj.
0.0556
N
5339919
Fstat

0.17)
-0.0076
(0.004)
0.0554
5350039
323.75

0.0004
(0.001)
0.0521
5339919

0.0001
(0.002)
0.0492
5339919

-0.0159∗∗∗
(0.003)
0.2009

-0.0043∗∗∗
(0.001)
0.0533
5339919

All regressions are robust SE, clustered at HRR (hospital referral region), and include patients with
the top 300 DRGs (approximately 90% of the sample). Fixed effects (FE) are given by column headers.
The dependent variable is indicated in the sub-headers. Total Spending includes readmission costs,
index admission inpatient costs and total home health costs. Inpatient spending is the dollars spent
for the index admission, Total Home Health Spending equals dollars spent for all connected home
health episodes following an inpatient stay. Vert. Int. represents patients receiving care at vertically
integrated systems. Patient (demographics, comorbidities, risk factors), hospital, agency (profit, urban,
size, teaching), and market (percent over age 65, number of long term care beds, hospital and agency
concentration, and skilled nursing facility concentration) controls are included.
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Table 12: Effect of Competition on Spending and Readmissions

(1)
(2)
No FE
No FE
b/se
b/se
A. Log Total Spending (mean: $15,430)
Agency HHI (Wt. Avg.)
-0.0059
(0.050)
Agency HHI (Exog.)
-0.1481∗∗∗
(0.038)
r2 adj.
0.4896
0.4905
1SD ∆ in HHI (%)
-0.09
-2.29
B. Log Inpatient Spending (mean: $10,500)
Agency HHI (Wt. Avg.)
0.1355∗
(0.059)
Agency HHI (Exog.)
-0.0813
(0.046)
r2 adj.
0.7548
0.7543
1SD ∆ in HHI (%)
-2.17
-1.26
C. Log HHA Total Spending (mean: $3,500)
Agency HHI (Wt. Avg.) -0.2579∗∗∗
(0.044)
Agency HHI (Exog.)
-0.2390∗∗∗
(0.031)
2
r adj.
0.2446
0.2442
1SD ∆ in HHI (%)
-4.13
-3.70
D. Readmissions (Mean: 0.17)
Agency HHI (Wt. Avg.)
0.0001
(0.005)
Agency HHI (Exog.)
r2 adj.
1SD ∆ in HHI (%)
N

0.0573
0.002
5339919

(3)
FE
b/se

(4)
FE
b/se

-0.1904∗∗∗
(0.026)

0.5010
-3.05

-0.0354
(0.021)
0.5009
-0.55

-0.1272∗∗∗
(0.026)

0.7870
-2.04

0.0143
(0.020)
0.7869
0.22

-0.2587∗∗∗
(0.045)

0.2166
-4.14

-0.0894∗∗
(0.031)
0.2164
-1.39

-0.0064
(0.006)
-0.0151∗∗∗
(0.004)
0.0573
-0.23
5339919

0.0549
-0.10
5338766

-0.0022
(0.006)
0.0549
-0.03
5338766

All regressions are robust SE, clustered at HSA (hospital service area) with HSA fixed effects
where indicated by the column headers. Sample consists of patients with the top 300 DRGs
(approximately 90% of the sample). The dependent variable is indicated in the sub-headers. Total Spending includes readmission costs, index admission inpatient costs and total home health
costs. Inpatient spending is the dollars spent for the index admission, total home health spending
equals dollars spent for all connected home health episodes following an inpatient stay. Agency
HHI (Wt. Avg) is the agency-specific weighted average of zip-level HHI’s. (Exog) is the predicted HHI estimated through conditional logit model of patient flow. See section 2.2.2 for more
details. Patient (demographics, comorbidities, risk factors), hospital, agency (profit, urban, size,
teaching), and market (percent over age 65, number of long term care beds, hospital and agency
concentration, and skilled nursing facility concentration) controls are included.
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Table 12 shows similar results for changing HHI concentrations. The concentration does not
affect the inpatient spending levels (no significance) but does significantly affect the home
health spending. A standard deviation increase in the home health HHI would decrease the
spending on home health agencies by 1.39-4.14% on average per person, or about $48-$145.
This is still substantial savings in total, considering almost 1.2 million people per year use
home health agencies following an acute-care stay. While the HHA savings are consistently
negative across all specifications, savings due to higher concentration is sensitive to the HHI
definition used or whether FE’s are used or not. Moreover, the impacts on readmissions are
very small in magnitude even if there is some significance, though the favored specification
shows no real impact on readmissions (-0.2%, not statistically significant).
One thing to note is that the readmission outcome is 30-day readmissions. There is the
possibility that readmissions within this time period would not be affected by recertification margins, which would happen at day 60. For robustness, I also use 60- and 90-day
readmissions which show no significant differences by vertical integration or competition.
Results are shown in Appendix Table B.8.
The tables described above consider the effect of vertical integration and competition on
spending and readmissions. However, in order to find the effect on spending and readmissions due to the change in recertification rates stemming from VI and/or competition, I
use instrument for recertifications using our variables of interest—vertical integration and
competition. The first stage and second stage least squares are shown here:

Yijht = β0 + β1 Recertit + β2 Y eart + β3 Controls + eijht
Recertit = γ0 + γ1 Indepijht + γ2 Y eart + γ3 Controls + εijht

where Indepijht are vertical integration or Agency HHI (Exog.) and Yijht are spending
and readmissions. For vertical integration, I show the main results using the hospitalagency Pair FE (one of the preferred specifications) but I also run this table using vertical
integration (bolstered by the idea that the Hausman test for endogeneity did not find
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VI to be statistically significantly endogenous) as well as using the differential distance
instrument. However, using the distance as the instrument for recertifications was not
powerful in the first stage (F-state = 9.75). Results for both can be found in Appendix
Table B.9. For competition, I use the logit-derived definition of HHI, “Agency HHI (Exog.)”
as the instrument. Controls includes the gamut of controls included in all specifications:
Patient (demographics, comorbidities, risk factors), hospital, agency (profit, urban, size,
teaching), and market (percent over age 65, number of long term care beds, hospital and
agency concentration, and skilled nursing facility concentration).
Table 13 shows the results for the causal effect of changes on recertifications through VI
and competition. In column (2), a patient with at least one recertification is correlated
with higher log inpatient spending (by 1.34%, p < 0.001), which corroborates the story that
sicker patients tend to be more likely to be recertified. However, when we instrument for
recertification using VI, I find that a recertified patient does not lead to significant changes
in inpatient setting but a 125% increase in home health costs. These results are sensible
as controls for DRGs in the inpatient level should not lead to large spending variations,
but the results show that each additional recertification leads to over double the home
health spending. This also makes sense as a recertification translates into a new episode
payment, which should be approximately the same as the prior episode. Again, there is
no change in readmission rates however. So the 22% (or 3.4 percentage point) decrease
in recertifications due to vertical integration can translate to quite a significant amount of
savings, approximately 125% on HHA costs, per recertification.
When I instrument for recertification using Agency HHI (Exog.), the estimated HHI from
conditional logit model, the results show there is no effect on inpatient spending through
recertifications (driven by HHI). This makes sense as competition around agencies should
not affect inpatient care. However I do find similarly large effects at the home health agency
level of over 180% increase in spending for recertified patients with no accompanying changes
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Table 13: Effect of Recertifications on Spending & Readmissions: Pair FE’s or Diff. Distance
as IV
Pair FE (VI)
(1)
(2)
(3)
OLS (VI) OLS (Recert) 2SLS (Recert)
b/se
b/se
b/se
Log Inpatient Spending (mean: $10,500)
Vert. Int.
0.0080
(0.005)
Agency HHI (Exog.)
Any Recert.
r2 adj.

0.7821

0.0134∗∗∗
(0.001)
0.7821

-0.1969
(0.115)
-0.0217

Log Total HHA Spending (mean: $3,500)
Vert. Int.
-0.0506∗∗∗
(0.011)
Agency HHI (Exog.)
Any Recert.
r2 adj.

0.1967

1.1406∗∗∗
(0.008)
0.3710

r2 adj.
N
First Stage
F-stat

0.0492
5339919

-0.354
(0.021)

0.0556

0.0166∗∗∗
(0.001)
0.1508

-0.3035
(0.448)
0.0156

1.1552∗∗∗
(0.009)
0.4011

1.8716∗∗∗
(0.503)
0.3085

0.0324∗∗∗
(0.005)
0.0563
5339919

0.0814
(0.117)
0.0156
5339919
-0.0500∗∗∗
(0.015)
10.68

-0.0894∗∗
(0.031)
1.2474∗∗∗
(0.194)
0.3435

30-Day Readmissions (mean: 0.17)
Vert. Int.
0.0001
(0.002)
Agency HHI (Exog.)
Any Recert.

Agency HHI (Exog.) as IV
(4)
(5)
(6)
OLS (HHI) OLS (Recert) 2SLS (Recert)
b/se
b/se
b/se

0.2242

-0.0041
(0.003)
0.0365∗∗∗
(0.005)
0.0501
5339919

-0.0037
(0.049)
-0.0024
5339919
-0.0405∗∗∗
(0.007)
34.63

0.0556
5339919

All regressions are robust SE, clustered at HRR (hospital referral region). Estimates shown are estimated
from specifications listed in Section 3.3. Columns (1)-(3) are Hospital-Agency Pair FE’s and (4)-(5) are HRR
FE’s. Sample consists of patients with the top 300 DRGs (approximately 90% of the sample). The dependent
variable is indicated in the sub-headers. Inpatient spending is the dollars spent for the index admission, total
home health spending equals dollars spent for all connected home health episodes following an inpatient stay.
Vert. Int. represents patients receiving care at vertically integrated systems. Vertical Integration is used as
the instrument for Any Recertification (0/1 dummy) in (3), and differential distance to nearest VI hospital
from patient’s zip code is the instrument used in (5). Patient (demographics, comorbidities, risk factors),
hospital, agency (profit, urban, size, teaching), and market (percent over age 65, number of long term care
beds, concentration levels of hospitals, agency and SNF) controls are included.
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on readmissions 9 .

3.4. A Deeper Dive: Event Studies, Spillovers, and the ‘Marginal’ Recert
3.4.1. Event study of integration change
To strengthen the story, I run several event studies. The first depicts the effects of an integration change on recertification rates, the second explores mechanism further by examining
whether patient flow or referral control could be the mechanism driving the main result as
my motivating story suggested, and the third shows impacts on home health spending.
The event study plots the effect of an integration change (here, normalized to zero) over the
number of years leading up to and following that change on the two outcomes of interest—
recertification rate and patient flow. Implicitly, the event study compares treated patients
(those attending a VI hospital and agency) to those that have not yet been treated, those
that will never be treated, and those that have always been treated. For additional power, I
combine systems that are integrating and disintegrating by multiplying disintegrations with
-1.
The main recertification specification using the Hospital-Agency Pair FE is similar to a
difference-in-difference (DID) construct. Using the event study to examine yearly pre- and
post-trends can validate this DID approach and provide a better understanding of when
and how much the integration change accounts for recertification rate change. However,
recertification rates, the outcome of interest in this paper, are an indirect effect of the
external pressures on agencies I examine— competition and vertical integration. I have
suggested one of the mechanisms through which vertical integration alters recertification
strategy is due to patient flow changes. That is, once acquired, the system prioritizes
moving patients downstream and out of the hospital sooner (saving money in the more
9

I run also the same table but restricted to patients that had zero to one recertification only to check if the
large percentage increase in spending at the HHA level is driven by patients that had many recertifications
(which naturally would be many times more expensive than a single episode). These results are shown in
Appendix Table B.10, which show that the HHA spending increases by 122-130%. Again, it shows that a
recertification more than doubles the costs of no recertification.
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expensive inpatient setting) and moreover, the clientle of the acquired agency is dominated
by the acquiring hospital, which essentially guarantees a flow of patients into the integrated
agency. This guarantee of patients allows the agency to count on a revenue stream from
the hospital without needing to increase their marketing investments among other hospitals
for more patients. Another term for this is referral control by the hospital. Using an event
study can provide some evidence supporting this mechanism if we see an increase in the
flow of patients following integration.
The event study specification, run at both the HRR FE and hospital-agency pair FE levels,
is as follows:

Yijt = α + β1 Integratedij + β2 Disintegratedij + β3 V ert Intj
+

+4
X

(3.1)

δik Y earsSinceijk × Dij + Y eart + γj + Xijt ν + eijt

k=−6

where, Yijt is outcome of interest for patient i in hospital-agency pair j in year t, gammaj
are time-invariant provider characteristics (which fall out in the pair FE), and Xijt ν are
patient level characteristics. Y earsSincejt is the number of years to or since integration
change. This ranges from -6 to +4 and is used as a dummy variable: 1 if that pair had an
integration change (was treated) and 0 if no change, where δk is the vector of coefficients
corresponding to each relative year. The treatment group are the pairs that integrate
(or disintegrate, multiplied by a -1 dummy); I interact the coefficients with a dummy for
integration (Dj = 1) or disintegration (Dj = −1).
The parameters of interest are the δk ’s corresponding to different years before and after the
integration change. I define date 0 as the year prior to integration change (or disintegration),
allowing the change to be measured from pre-period to post-periods without the ambiguity
of what changes may have occurred during the transition year. Integrated, Disintegrated,
and V ert Int are dummies indicating: a firm that integrates during the period, a firm that
disintegrates during the period, and firms that are vertically integrated the entire period
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(1) or non-integrated the entire period (0). These fall out of the equation when running at
pair FE level. The figures below plot the δk coefficients.
The outcomes of interest are: (1) recertification dummy (of patient i attending hospitalagency pair j in year t), (2) patient flow as defined by the percent of patients in the agency
arriving from the (dis)integrating hospital in question— in other words, the percent of
patients from hospital-agency pair j among all patients in that agency. This would be 1 if
all patients in the agency were referred by the same hospital. (3) I also look at the change
on HHA total spending.
Figure 10a shows a clear decrease in recertification rate following integration chage (at zero)
for both compared within HRR but also within the hospital-agency pair itself. The latter is
of more importance and should be focused upon more heavily as it plots the DID approach
used in the Pair FE specifications. The event study validates this DID approach as pretrends appear to be steady, followed by a significant drop from the lead year (y = −1) to
the first follow-up year (y = 1). The drop is around 4 percentage points, which matches
closely to the Pair FE specification in Table 5 of 3.96 percentage points.
Figure 10b demonstrates that integration itself causes a uptick in patients flowing from
hospital to acquired agency, or at the very least, a reversal of a downward trend of patients
leaving. The HRR FE plot is less precisely measured but does show in the pre-trend a falling
percentage of patients from the referring hospital, but this evens out in the post-period.
However, the Pair FE plot—the more meaningful specification—shows that there is a steady
percent of patients in the pre-trend arriving at the agency. This increases after integration
and continues to follow an upward trend in the four years afterwards. The figure suggests
that after integration, the agency gains approximately 5% more patients in the first year
and nearly 10% more by year four. This evidence supports the idea that integration leads
to increase in patient flow to the integrated agency, which reduces the agency’s costs of
investing in attracting new patients.
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Finally, the event study for HHA spending (Figure 10c) corroborates the regressions—there
is a clear drop in HHA spending following the year of integration change. For the Pair FE,
the event study estimates a savings of over $350 in the first year on average per person and
as much as $575 by the fourth year of integration.
Figure 10a: Pair-level Recertifications

Figure 10b: Pair-level Patient Flow

This event study graphs the pattern of the δik coefficients from equation 3.1. The dependent variable
is (a) recertifications, (b) the percent of the agency’s patients arriving from the (dis)integrating
hospital, (c) HHA Spending (below).
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Figure 10c: HHA Spending

This event study graphs the pattern of the δik coefficients from equation 3.1. The dependent variable
is (a) recertifications, (b) the percent of the agency’s patients arriving from the (dis)integrating hospital, (c) HHA Spending. The coefficients demonstrate the effect of an integration change (normalized
to zero) in the years leading up to and following that change. The graphs plots the coefficients of
years relative to treatment (integration change). I interact the coefficients with a dummy for integration (Dj = 1) or disintegration (Dj = 1). Individual demographic and severity controls, provider
characteristic controls, and year trends are included. Confidence intervals are at the 90% level, and
standard errors are clustered at the HRR level.
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3.4.2. Medicare Advantage influence on competition
My sample consists of only Medicare Fee-for-Service (FFS) patients, and of course, Medicare FFS is not a closed environment without interactions to other types of insured patients.
Home health agencies rely heavily on Medicare for business—according to a study by Deloitte (2014) using National Health Expenditure accounts, they find that 43% of HHA
business is Medicare, 37% is Medicaid (including dual-eligibles), 7% is private or commercial business, 8% is out-of-pocket patients, and 5% are “other.” However, using OASIS
data, we find the make-up is different as it is largely made of Medicare patients in the
data. The average percent of FFS in HHAs is 66%, with MA percentage of 17%, and 11.5%
Medicaid (FFS and HMOs). There is substantial geographic variation; the percentage of
MA patients range from 8.40% to 24.68% of patients (this relationship is directly inverse of
FFS of course) between 9 main geographic areas.
It is important to consider what impacts MA patients may have on HHA strategic choices on
profit-maximizing, particularly considering that payment structures—and therefore provider
incentives— differ greatly under MA contracts compared to FFS. Medicare Advantage (MA)
patients enroll with a private health insurer, who negotiates rates with all providers including home health agencies and can act as gatekeeper for additional care by requiring approval
from providers. These insurers, who receive a capitated payment per enrollee for total care
in a year, have an incentive to manage and coordinate care, unlike the Medicare FFS system
with non-integrated upstream-downstream providers. Indeed, these plans tend to steer patients towards less intensive and less expensive care settings including across provider types
but within provider types as well. These plans also tend to pay less than Medicare FFS
rates, pay differently than FFSs episodic payments, or require post-acute care providers to
assume some financial risk and require patients to pay out-of-pocket costs for post-acute
care to limit use (Sood et al. 2017a). This payment structure then incentivizes post-acute
care facilities to reduce lengths of stay or to discharge sooner. There is not good information on the specific percentages of agencies that contract with MA and under what types
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of contracts.
Overall, a study by Huckfeldt et al. (2017) find that these differences in contracting result
in lower post-acute care use and intensity without worse readmission rates. MA also has the
ability to contract exclusively with certain post acute care facilities, guaranteeing volume in
exchange for margin, but many home health agencies have chosen to not contract with MA
plans because of the increased administrative burdens, pre-authorization requirements for
additional home health episodes, and lower rates (Zigmond October 2013). For example,
taken from the website of the Northshore Home Health agency (Northshore Home Health
Care 2017):
Currently we are not able to accept patients with HMO. This is because HMO’s
place higher restrictions on the types of care you can get, and all of the services
must be pre-authorized by them. Also, they delay payments to the home health
agency – they only pay us for services provided every six months.
Because of the active role of Medicare Advantage plans, this changes the relationship dynamic between hospitals and HHAs, although specifically how is not clear. The entity that
has more patient-steering power shifts from hospitals to the plans. Plans can contract with
HHAs at lower rates in exchange for volume, rather than appealing to hospitals themselves
for volume. With plans contracting with fewer HHAs, this may increase the flow of (MA)
patients to these HHAs. Additionally, considering the authorization of care featured in MA
plans, we would expect reductions in length of care on average.
The overall concern here is that Medicare Advantage is an omitted variable in the main
specification described in this paper. Do increasing rates of Medicare Advantage change
the way that agencies strategically choose how to invest in retention versus acquisition?
Does Medicare advantage affect fee-for-service (FFS) recertifications? I find that there is
no significant effect on the main results when I control for the percentage of MA patients
in the agency (see Table 14). This is because the MA percent does not impact FFS HHI or
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HHI measures that include MA and FFS patients, even though it does impact recertification
rates (see Table 15).
Table 14: Effect of HHA Concentration on Recertifications (Various HHI definitions)
(1)
No FE
b/se
With Medicare Advantage % as a control
Agency HHI (Wt Avg.)
-0.1762∗∗∗
(0.015)
Agency HHI (Exog.)
Outcome: Recerts

(2)
No FE
b/se

0.1848

-0.0866∗∗∗
(0.015)

0.1820

Various HHI measures including HMO population
Agency HHI (Wt Avg.)
-0.1762∗∗∗
(0.015)
HMO HHI
-0.1090∗∗∗
(0.011)
HMO + FFS HHI
r2 adj.
N

0.1848
2952607

(4)
FE
b/se

(5)
FE
b/se

(6)
FE
b/se

-0.1840∗∗∗
(0.032)

Agency HHI (Regional Exog)
r2 adj.

(3)
No FE
b/se

0.1716
2729273

-0.0514∗∗
(0.018)
-0.1427∗∗∗
(0.013)
0.1834

0.1442

0.1439

-0.0576∗
(0.024)
0.1439

-0.1840∗∗∗
(0.032)
-0.0163
(0.011)
-0.1237∗∗∗
(0.012)
0.1834
2952607

0.1442
2952607

0.1340
2729273

-0.0810∗∗∗
(0.024)
0.1440
2952607

All regressions are robust SE and clustered at the HRR level (hospital referral region) with the dependent variable being
any recertification. The first section adds percent of Medicare Advantage (MA) patients in the agency as a control. The
second section shows the effect of a variety of HHI definitions on recerts. HMO HHI is calculated only using MA patients.
HMO + FFS combines all Medicare patients. MA data was only obtained for 2010-2013. Agency HHI (Wt. Avg)
is the agency-specific weighted average of zip-level HHI’s. (Exog) is the predicted HHI estimated through conditional
logit model of patient flow, and (Regional Exog) allows for greater geographic flexibility for the taste parameters using
10 separate models grouped by geographic area. Patient controls include demographics, comorbidities, risk factors;
hospital and HHA controls include profit status, teaching status, bed size, and rural/urban; and market controls include
percent of market over age 65, number of long term care beds, and hospital concentration index.

Table 15: Effect of Medicare Advantage on HHA Concentration

Outcome:
% MA in Agency
N
r2 adj.

(1)
Recerts
b/se
-0.1595∗∗∗
(0.011)
2952607
0.1439

(2)
All Medicare
b/se
0.0063
(0.009)
2952607
0.0492

Definitions of HHI
(3)
(4)
FFS (Wt. Avg.)
FFS (Exog.)
b/se
b/se
0.0044
0.0022
(0.007)
(0.003)
2952607
2952607
0.0292
0.0054

(5)
HMO only
b/se
0.0462∗∗
(0.015)
2952607
0.0193

All regressions are robust SE and clustered at the HRR level (hospital referral region). The dependent variable is
shown in each column header. Medicare Advantage (MA) data was only obtained for 2010-2013. FFS (Wt. Avg) is the
agency-specific weighted average of zip-level HHI’s. (Exog) is the predicted HHI estimated through conditional logit
model of patient flow. ‘All Medicare’ combines FFS and MA patients while ‘HMO only’ is MA patients only. Patient
controls include demographics, comorbidities, risk factors; hospital and HHA controls include profit status, teaching
status, bed size, and rural/urban; and market controls include percent of market over age 65, number of long term care
beds, and hospital concentration index.

Do greater rates of MA have any effect on FFS Medicare? I find evidence that agencies
may adopt similar practice patterns for their FFS patients as the percentage of MA patients
increases, essentially a “spillover” effect. To show this, I develop three variables to measure
MA penetration: the percentage of MA patients seen in the specific agency (agency level
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variable), the percentage of MA patients among home health users in the HSA market (HSA
level variable), and the percentage of all MA enrollees in the county regardless of HHA use
(county level). Appendix Table B.11 shows the average agency HHI by quartile of each
MA variable. There is good support across the measures as they look similar across the
percentiles.
We generally see that as MA penetration increases (for any definition used), the agency
concentration increases, with the greatest increase occurring during the shift from lowest
quartile to second quartile of MA. Results show that the effect of concentration (HHI) on
recertification decreases as Medicare Advantage usage increases. The competition effect is
greatest in areas with very low (bottom quartile) of MA enrollment or usage and declines
with increasing MA enrollment or usage. This supports the spillover idea, that actually
increasing MA patients in the agency or in the county results in less intense and shorter
treatment not just for the MA patient but also the FFS patient. As the agency’s patient
population moves from FFS patients to MA patients, their incentives to profit-maximize will
focus more on MA patients and working on the contracts with MA plans. Their tradeoff in
investing in recertification of FFS patients diminishes as they become a smaller and smaller
percentage of their bottom line. These full results are reported in Table 16.
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Table 16: Effect of HHA Concentration on Any Recertification at quartiles of Medicare
Advantage participation
(1)
(2)
(3)
All
<P25
P25-P50
b/se
b/se
b/se
A. Quartiles of Percent of MA Patients seen in the Agency
Dependent variable: Any Recertification
Agency HHI (Wt. Avg) -0.0762∗∗∗ -0.1478∗∗∗ -0.0896∗∗∗
(0.018)
(0.028)
(0.023)
r2 adj.
0.1857
0.2208
0.1906
Agency HHI (Exog)
r2 adj.
N

-0.0346∗
(0.015)
0.1851
3297693

-0.0604∗∗
(0.022)
0.2191
823356

-0.0541∗∗
(0.019)
0.1900
825340

(4)
P50-P75
b/se

(5)
≥P75
b/se

-0.0169
(0.022)
0.1587

-0.0416
(0.022)
0.1376

0.0060
(0.022)
0.1586
823990

-0.0235
(0.021)
0.1374
825007

B. Quartiles of Percent of MA Patient using Home Health in HSA
Dependent variable: Any Recertification
Agency HHI (Wt. Avg) -0.0775∗∗∗ -0.1152∗∗∗ -0.0874∗∗∗ -0.0369
(0.018)
(0.023)
(0.025)
(0.026)
r2 adj.
0.1854
0.2166
0.1906
0.1682
Agency HHI (Exog)
r2 adj.
N

-0.0343∗
(0.015)
0.1848
3297705

-0.0581∗∗
(0.018)
0.2153
823973

-0.0295
(0.025)
0.1898
824221

C. Quartiles of Percent of all MA Enrollees by County
Dependent variable: Any Recertification
Agency HHI (Wt. Avg) -0.0884∗∗∗ -0.1527∗∗∗ -0.0690∗∗
(0.018)
(0.027)
(0.026)
r2 adj.
0.1860
0.2295
0.1757
Agency HHI (Exog)
r2 adj.
N

-0.0422∗∗
(0.015)
0.1853
3297260

-0.0763∗∗∗
(0.019)
0.2275
825592

-0.0159
(0.023)
0.1751
825025

-0.0826∗∗
(0.026)
0.1513

-0.0115
(0.022)
0.1680
822610

-0.0523∗
(0.022)
0.1509
826901

-0.0700∗
(0.030)
0.1745

-0.0583∗
(0.029)
0.1587

-0.0293
(0.022)
0.1740
827849

-0.0286
(0.029)
0.1584
818794

All regressions are robust SE and clustered at the HRR level (hospital referral region). (2)-(5) show
the regressions on increasing quartiles of Medicare Advantage penetration, as defined by the italic
headers. <P25 means lowest quartile of MA participation, ≥P75 is highest quartile. Medicare
Advantage data was only obtained for 2010-2013. Agency HHI (Wt. Avg) is the agency-specific
weighted average of zip-level HHI’s. (Exog) is the predicted HHI estimated through conditional
logit model of patient flow, and (Regional Exog) allows for greater geographic flexibility for the
taste parameters using 10 separate models grouped by geographic area. See section 2.2.2 for more
details. Patient controls include demographics, comorbidities, risk factors; hospital and HHA
controls include profit status, teaching status, bed size, and rural/urban; and market controls
include percent of market over age 65, number of long term care beds, and hospital concentration
index.
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3.4.3. Change in patient severity between the marginal and average recertification
One relevant question is: as recertifications under competition or vertical integration increase, what is happening to the appropriateness or general severity level? More specifically,
how does the marginal recertification compare to the average recertification?
To answer this question, we can use a model with some structure to examine what the
severity or appropriateness for a recertification is for the marginal patient. This model
follows a similar model from Gruber et al. (1999b).
First, let Sjt /Pjt be the average severity or outcome of interest (Sjt ) in j home health
agency in year t. Pjt is the number of patients in agency-year jt. So the change in the
average outcome, Sjt , of patients in an agency can be found by taking the partial derivative
of the average with respect to log recertification rate, ln(recertjt ):
∂Sjt
∂(Sjt /Pjt )
Sjt
=
−
∂ ln(recertjt )
∂Pjt Pjt

This is equivalent to the difference in the marginal and the average outcomes.
We can use the following regression to find this difference:

Sjt /Pjt = α1 ln(recertjt ) + α2 Y eart + Kjt β + εjt

(3.2)

where Kjt are agency characteristics. The coefficient of interest is α1 :
∂(Sjt /Pjt )
= α1
∂ ln(recertjt )

I use four different measures of severity or appropriateness. Three are simple variables:
(1) age, (2) Charlson index measuring comorbidities, (3) logged inpatient spending. The
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fourth is an empirical measure of “appropriateness” found by predicting the propensity of
recertification for a patient controlling for the potentially endogenous variables of vertical
integration and competition.
To achieve this, I follow a similar model from Chandra and Staiger (2007). I estimate a
logistic regression for:

Pr(Recertijk ) = G(θ0 + θ1 V ert.Intijk + θ2 HHIjk + θk + Xi Φ)

where i is each individual, j is the agency, and k is the HRR market (i.e., θk is a HRR fixed
effect). Xi Φ is the gamut of individual level controls including demographics, comorbidities,
and HCCI risk factors.
Then I create a predicted measure of the propensity for recertification without the influence
of vertical integration, competition, or HRR-level differences:

P̂r(Recertij ) = G(θ0 + Xi Φ)

represents the “clinical appropriateness” for recertifications as it excludes any endogenous
reasons for recertification and only counts observable severity of the patient.
A potential concern is that using ln(recert) may be endogenous to severity as one should
expect that more sick patients should be recertified more and what we really want to capture
is the effect of changing recertification rates through vertical integration and HHI. Because
this model is run at the agency level, vertical integration is a continuous variable describe
the percent of patients in the agency that arrive from the vertically associated hospital10 .
The results are shown in Table 17. We see that the marginal patient from increasing recertification rates in an agency would be younger by 0.32 years, or 0.48 years younger than
the average when increasing rates are driven by (non-)integration. There seems to be no
10

The differential difference instrument only works at an individual level and therefore cannot be used in
this instance.
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Table 17: Estimates of Relationship between Agency Recertification Rates and Severity
Measures

(1)
OLS
b/se
Dependent variable: Age
ln(recert)
-0.0032∗∗∗
(0.001)
r2 adj.
0.0122

TSLS using instruments:
(2)
(3)
Vert. Int. HHI (Exog.)
b/se
b/se
-0.0048∗
(0.002)
0.0112

Dependent variable: Charlson Index
ln(recert)
0.0706∗∗∗
0.0319∗∗
(0.004)
(0.012)
r2 adj.
0.1218
0.1125

-0.0008
(0.003)
0.0100

0.1184∗∗∗
(0.016)
0.1075

Dependent variable: Log Inpatient Spending
ln(recert)
-0.0726∗∗∗ 0.1135∗∗∗
-0.0726
(0.009)
(0.028)
(0.045)
r2 adj.
0.0553
-0.1788
0.0552
Dependent variable: Recert. Appropriateness
ln(recert)
0.0679∗∗∗ 0.0620∗∗∗
0.1329∗∗∗
(0.003)
(0.008)
(0.011)
r2 adj.
0.3138
0.3130
0.2231
N
56853
56853
56853
First-Stage F
295.0
75.4
Coefficients are from regression estimation shown in (1). In each
model, the estimation are robust se with the main variable of
interest being log recertification rate of the home health agency.
The dependent variable is shown in the header of each section.
Recertification Appropriateness is a predicted propensity for recertification as determined by patient demographics, comorbidities, and risk factors, and excludes any influence from vertical integration, competition, or difference in market-level rates. Controls include year and the same patient level variables used to
predict recertification appropriateness.
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difference from competition. For measures of comorbidity, we see that the marginal recertified patient has more comorbidities than the average. For inpatient spending, the results
are more mixed. OLS results show that the marginal patient has lower inpatient spending
rates (by 7.3%), but the 2SLS using vertical integration shows that inpatient spending may
actually be more and then the estimate is again negative for competition 2SLS. This might
derive from the idea that competition leads to more recertifications that are unnecessary
but each marginal VI recertification should be a more necessary recertification as the cost
to retention increases. We also see that the “appropriateness” increases across all three
specifications (which also is derived from demographics, comorbidities and risk factors).
These results are somewhat surprising. The expectation would have been that the marginal
recertified patient would be healthier than the average with rising recertification rates for
at least the HHI 2SLS specifications. Age often is good proxy for health among Medicare
patients; it may be the case that the Charlson Index is not good predictors of health (or
recertification need) among HHA patients, or that there may be a better, more targeted way
to predict “appropriateness” of HHA care than including all observable individual controls
found in the dataset. However, the age and inpatient spending results are more align with
what was expected.
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CHAPTER 4 : Discussion and Conclusion
Consistently across all results, I find that vertical integration lowers recertification rates as
does increasing agency concentration. I find that competition leads to an excess of medical
care with seemingly little benefit, which runs counter to traditional economic theory that
competition should lead markets to the efficient outcome. In fact, it appears that vertical
integration and concentration can serve as substitutes in improving efficient care. The results show significant effects on home health spending (unsurprising given the decrease in
recertifications, each of which translates into savings), but little effects on inpatient spending from the index admission and little effects on readmissions (both 30-day and 60-day).
Thus I rule out that additional home health care is negatively affecting (or substituting
for) inpatient care at either the index admission period or through readmissions. Without
any apparent detrimental effects on readmissions, which would cost Medicare, I find significant home health savings for VI entities and concentrated agencies due to reduction in
recertification, ranging from 160% to 180% per recertification and 5-7% overall on average.

4.1. Mechanisms
Exact mechanisms that drive these results—a reduction in recertifications under VI and
less competition—is not entirely clear, but I have presented a theoretical model suggesting
some mechanisms and taken many steps to rule out alternative stories. The model describes
changes in the costs of attracting new patients relative to retaining current patients. Under
vertical integration, the acquiring hospital guarantees the downstream acquired agency a
flow of patients, which drastically reduces the cost of attracting new patients. Hospitals have
such an incentive due to greater aligned incentives under integration to provide recovery care
in a more cost-effective setting. Using an event study, I find evidence supporting the idea
that the flow of patients arriving from the upstream hospital increases following integration.
There is an approximate 5-10% increase in the percent of VI patients in the agency.
Could this be more a story of capacity then? It may be that VI agencies recertify less
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because they need to leave capacity available for hospitals which move patients faster. This
is possible but difficult to check in the data since staffing information is not well-populated
or accurate.However, this story is not incongruous to the results or narrative shown in this
paper as capacity still links to patient flow and the relative “cheapness” of attracting new
patients. The flow of patients could be thought of as new patients replacing discharged
patients in the HHA, thus leading to fewer recertifications—the main conclusion of the
paper. Of course, this leads to the question: are there negative consequences on patient
quality due to less frequent recertifications (which imply earlier discharges)? I find little
quality differences as measured by readmissions.
Simple summary statistics comparing VI to non-VI patients and recertified to non-recertified
patients show that there are clear differences in patient severity, which may be responsible
for the results under simple OLS regressions. However, we can rule out observable and
unobservable severity driving the results through the use of an instrumental variable (IV).
Using an IV regression that is independent of patient severity but is highly predictive of
attending a vertically integrated system alleviates concerns of unobservable patient selection into the hospital as well as from hospital into specific agency. The instrument used,
differential distance to VI hospital from patient’s home, randomizes patients to both the
VI hospital and the VI agency based on relative distances. In other words, it assigns the
patient to a VI pair if they live near a VI hospital and not based on severity, thus getting
around any selection on severity issues. For example, this rules out the story that patients
with higher acute severity are sent to VI HHAs for closer monitoring while chronic but
steady patients are sent to (non-VIs) HHAs near their home but are more likely to be
recertified. Furthermore, a Durbin-Wu-Hausman test for endogenous regressor found that
vertical integration was not significantly endogenous— the estimate did not vary greatly
from OLS to IV specifications (-4.37 to -3.39 percentage points).
Additional specifications and robustness checks instill greater confidence that selection on
severity is not driving the results in either the IV estimates or the provider-level FE spec-
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ifications. I consider a population of AMI patients living within 30 miles of the hospital
used as well as a matched sample—both of which are well-balanced populations on observables. The coefficient on vertical integration remains robust, ranging from -4.89 to -5.97
percentage points.
Another possibility is that unobservable agency quality leads to reduced recertifications and
higher quality agencies tend to be integrated or acquired. If we assume that the agency
has been of high quality throughout the time period or increased its quality before or after
integration, we can use our hospital-agency pair FE’s to eliminate this reason as the driver
of recertification change. The FE’s themselves sweep out time-invariant characteristics,
such as unchanging high quality. In addition, the event study shows steady pre-trends prior
to the year of integration change, followed by a significant (approximately 5 percentage
points, similar to the other estimates) decrease in recertification rates, and relatively steady
post-trends. The only question that I cannot control for is if quality changes independently
of integration in the same year; the FE methods and event studies do not shed light on
this possibility. However, I argue that if quality changes because of integration, the main
conclusion still stands— vertical integration reduces recertification rates. It would be impossible to way whether this was through improved coordination or other efficiency gains
through the reorganization of the firm.
What if improved quality was an effect (not a cause)? In the literature of effects of competition, many have found that increasing competition among providers leads to increases
in quality and other amenities, which in turn increase costs (Gaynor 2006, Held and Pauly
1983, Sood et al. 2017b). This could account for increasing costs or recertifications found
in this paper. Two things to note which push against this story: (1) There is no evidence
of improved patient readmission rates for increasing competition. In fact, the estimates
lean the opposite way with fewer readmissions under less competition so there is not good
evidence of improved quality amidst greater intensity. (2) Agencies rely heavily on hospitals for referrals (hence the need to invest in building strong relationships with hospitals).
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While hospitals and patients may choose agencies based on intensity of care (proxying for
quality), it is much more likely that this margin occurs over the intensity of care within an
episode and not over the number of episodes provided in the long-run. Will patients choose
agencies because they hope to increase their probability of recertification in 60 days? It is
more convincing that it would be based on the quality and intensity of care received per
week or month.
4.1.1. Policy Implications
There are several policy implications to take away from this work. First, this is yet another
piece of evidence that payment structures and potential unintended consequences should be
thought about carefully. Increased quantity of care as a result of a pay-per-unit structure
is not a new finding by any means but still an important one, particularly in this age
where increasing high-value care and reducing inefficiency in our health care system is
evermore important. There are several potential ways to restructure home health PPS,
ranging from setting a single episode payment (following hospital PPS) to increasing costs
to recertifying such as adding a physician visit, greater auditing oversight, or other checks
on recretifications. Ellis and McGuire (1986) claims that a mixed-reimbursement (partial
prospective, partial cost-based) is superior to either pure prospective or pure cost-based;
however, to achieve these efficiencies, the HHA payment structure should be reversed — a
single payment for the treatment accompanied by a smaller positive payment per unit. Or
another solution would be to impose a true prospective payment system.
This work also sheds some light on benefits of greater oversight of care and the many
ways through which that can be achieved: vertical integration, Medicare Advantage, or
increasing market power in a vertically arranged market. Under vertical integration and
Medicare Advantage, a third-party takes a significant interest in managing costs, timing, and
location—the upstream hospital in the former and the MA plan in the latter case. Both of
these result in decreasing recertification rates, even for non-MA patients. Both VI and MA
also insulate certain agencies from increasing competitive forces, either through controlling
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the referrals and sending a large percentage to one agency or through exclusive contracting
that guarantees volume, respectively. Similarly, high-concentration agencies means, by
definition, that they control a significant portion of the market share, whether this is due to
quality, reputation, or marketing. But if these agencies have built strong relationships with
certain hospitals, this may proxy for vertical integration and/or exclusive contracting. So in
fact, greater concentration can proxy for the same type of oversight or coordination that VI
achieves through realignment of incentives or MA achieves through more careful oversight
of provider care provision. This implies provider structures that incentivize coordinating
care through the continuum of care, such as Accountable Care Organizations, are likely to
help reduce low-value care.
There are broader implications beyond the health care space as well. First, I find evidence
that vertical integration and competition do impact customer retention versus acquisition
strategies. In a context without price levers and with straightforward tasks, competition
leads to a “gaming” or exploitation of the payment structure rather than innovation as
modeled in the marketing literature. On the other hand, in this context, referral control in
fact leads to efficiency gains, and not anticompetitive behavior as commonly seen in other
literature examining referral control impacts.
Finally, there are some antitrust implications to this work. The results point to the perverse
result of increasing competition causing greater inefficiency. This stems from the fixed
payment structure of the health care industry, where increasing pressures from competition
lead providers to exploit the payment and regulatory structures placed upon them rather
than to find ways to lower prices or improve efficiencies. This is yet another thing to keep in
mind for regulators when they consider the costs and the benefits to consumers of mergers
or consolidating market powers.
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4.1.2. Limitations
As with all work, there are several limitations to this work that should be kept in mind
when interpreting results. One limitation is the difficulty in removing both patient selection
bias and provider-level bias at the same time. The approach taken here removes one at a
time and examine the results separately. Additionally, fixed effects can only eliminate
time-invariant unobservables. Because the provider-level fixed effects were relatively stable
even after adding patient level controls that accounted for significantly more variation (as
measured through R2 ), there is some support that the provider-level bias was not a large
factor.
Another limitation is that this empirical work focused on recertifications but did not explore
other margins of care intensity or quantity. For example, it does not look at competition
effects on the intensity of care within an episode, which has been the focus of other papers
(e.g., Sood et al. (2017b)). As such, I cannot say much on the topic of competition leading
to increases in care intensity as a means to attract patients. Furthermore, the results on
patient outcomes is limited to only readmissions (though I did do robustness checks on 30day to 90-day readmissions and found no difference). Mortality rates are not necessarily a
good outcome for HHA settings, but HHA outcomes should be measured by improvements
on daily living or mobility, such as getting dressed or pain. Furthermore, there has been
evidence of upcoding as a result of prospective payments systems (Dafny 2005), which I
do not explore in this paper. However, I do run specifications with and without HHRG
controls and find no significant differences (not shown).
I do explore spillover effects from Medicare Advantage, but there are also other factors that
can influence HHA’s as well as use of post-acute care and which type. The overall spending
results are somewhat limited to just home health and hospitals, but it does not say very
much about the different (and differential) use of home health agencies over time. I try to
control for this by including market-level fixed effects so that different market trends do not
affect the results, and I also control for elderly population, concentration of skilled nursing
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facilities, and other market-level variables that may influence or proxy for extensive margin
changes.
Finally, it is important to note that the perverse competition conclusions may not necessarily
extrapolate to other contexts as several market factors play a role in outcome. This is
also true for the efficiency gains from referral control. First, this is a market of regulated
prices. Traditionally, competition would result in a decrease in prices to adjust for declining
demand, but in this context prices do not change. Second, patients are largely takers in
the Medicare home health industry and do not have incentives to limit or decline care. In
other markets (including health care), consumers or patients consider the costs compared
to the benefits of a service which serves as a limiting factor. However, since they face no
out-of-pocket costs and I assume (which I do not think is a great leap) that any additional
care has diminishing marginal non-negative utility to an individual, patients essentially
have unlimited consumption. They will take whatever care is suggested to them. Third,
even within health care, home health’s PPS differs from other PPS systems as it includes
this unlimited recertification feature. This allows for the direct substitutability of retaining
current patients for new patients. The evidence shown in this work strongly suggests a
rethinking of this feature. Fourth, not all vertically integrated health care providers are
created equal. The power-wielding hospital holds the residual rights and is upstream of the
home health agencies. But consider a hospital purchasing a physician group: there is greater
potential harm if hospitals do this to direct referrals to themselves away from better quality
hospitals, as Nakamura (2010) found. Hospitals are not allowed to exclusively contract
with agencies without offering patients choice, which limits the potential damaging effects
of referral control.
4.1.3. Conclusion
I have considered the causal effects of vertical integration and competition on recertifications from home health agencies. Home health agencies have unlimited recertifications for
episodes, and I examine the tendency of agencies to increase their recertification rates un-
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der vertical integration or changes in their competition levels. The results show that there
is a distinct pattern in the recertification rates by concentration and by vertical integration; highly competitive agencies are associated with much higher rates of recertification
while vertically integrated entities have persistently lower recerification rates regardless of
competition levels.
Acknowledging the potential for bias on vertical integration, I construct a differential distance instrument to control for patient selection, use hospital-agency pair fixed effects to
examine the influence of provider-level biases, and use a restricted sample of only AMI
patients using agencies within 30 miles as well as a propensity matched sample. Under
all these specifications, the results are consistent, suggesting a 3.39 - 3.96 percentage point
decrease (22-26% change) in the probability of recertification. At a spending difference of
5.1 - 6.8%, or $180-$240, on average of total home health spending, this could lead to significant savings in home health spending if the 1.2 million patients attending non-integrated
systems per year following an acute-care stay saw the average savings of those attending
vertically integrated systems. Event studies on recertification rates and spending validate
these approaches and results; an event study on the flow of patients also suggests that
referral control is the mechanism.
I also estimate predicted patient flows from hospital to HHAs to create an exogenous measure of HHA concentration to identify causal effects on recertifications. The preferred specification suggests that a standard deviation increase in agency HHI would lead to a 0.78-2.14
percentage point (or 5-14% change) decrease in recertification rate and a decrease in home
health spending of 1.39-4.14% per person on average. Reducing unnecessary recertifications
could lead to significant savings for Medicare in the post-acute space; a good place to start
would be rethinking the unlimited recertifications without patient copays and perhaps also
how to improve care coordination between hospitals and post-acute care providers.
More broadly, these results indicate that vertical integration does have some benefits for
savings and care coordination through referral control. The Medicare Advantage spillover
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reinforces the idea that overseeing the flow of patients can reduce recertifications. This is
encouraging for the push towards shared savings and Accountable Care Organizations that
may be able to align the incentives of patients, providers, and payers. The results also
suggest that under heavily price-regulated industries, competition is not always welfareenhancing as there may be unintended consequences where firms bolster quantity, in this
case, to replace falling profits. Ellis and McGuire (1986) makes a theoretical case for
optimal reimbursement policy to be a mix of prospective and fee-for-service (FFS) payment;
however, in this case, policymakers may want to consider reversing which parts of the home
health payment follow a prospective versus FFS schedule. There may be beneficial Medicare
savings if, for example, there was a limit on episodes but paid more on an FFS on visits
within an episode.
I see this study as additional evidence of how payment structures and incentives influence
provider choice, how changing those incentives to encourage coordination can improve inefficient care provision, how referral control under vertical integration can sometimes lead
to efficiency gains, and how competition does not always lead to efficient outcomes under
regulated payment structures. I examine these in the new context of recertification rates in
home health agencies, an outcome that has not be studied before. There are many additional questions yet to be answered, particularly of mechanism, overall health care system
savings, and whether these findings expand to other post-acute care settings such as skilled
nursing facilities.
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APPENDIX
A.1. Appendix
A.1.1. Theory Mathematics
Recall from the first order conditions:
∂π
:
∂r

p̄ − cq = βN1β−1 rβ−1

 1
p̄ − cq β−1
N1 =
βrβ−1
! 1
β−1
p̄ − cq
=
β( αβ N1α−β )


p̄ − cq 1/(α−1)
=
α

after substituting in for r∗ in Equation (1.2).
Similarly, it can be shown that N10 =

N1∗
N10



p̄−cq
αγ

1/(α−1)

. Substituting, we find:

  p̄−c  1/(α−1)
q

= 

α
p̄−cq
αγ



= γ 1/(α−1)

A.1.2. Theory with utility framework
Here I show that the results still hold if the provider is a non-profit maximizing firm and
instead maximizes both quantity and profits under a utility framework, which is a common
model for health care providers. The model demonstrates that when the agency is concerned
about quantity, they will recertify more when competition increases. It is not uncommon for
researchers to model health care providers as utility maximizers where the utility includes
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profits and quantity. This was first introduced by Newhouse (1970) to explain not-forprofit provider behavior. But since then, it has commonly been used to explain behavior of
both not-for-profit and for-profit hospitals as well as physicians to represent the idea that
providers value improving access, enhancing their reputation or prestige, and providing
better or more intensive care. Dranove (1988) includes quantity and profits in the hospital
utility functions to explain cost-shifting behavior. McGuire & Pauly (1991) uses this type
of utility function as well to discuss target income theory for physicians. Dafny (2003)
includes a measure of ‘intensity’ which is represented by quantity of services to study hospital
responses to price changes.
I am generally interested in the relationship between incoming (new) patients and the number of existing patients that are recertified for another episode. Competition will decrease
the number of new patients that the agency receives (assuming there is no change in overall
demand for home health services), which decreases the overall quantity of patients seen.
Agencies have a vehicle through which they may choose to increase their quantity via recertification.
The set up follows the model introduced in McGuire & Pauly (1991). The agency’s utility
is increasing in profits (π = mQ) and in total quantity of patients (Q = N (1 + r)), and
decreasing in amount of recertification conducted r. For simplicity, I assume each patient
is the same severity, thus the same Medicare payment, and requires the same treatments,
thus costing the agency the same to provide care. Thus, m is the margin that the agency
earns from Medicare patients, or p̄ − c where p̄ is the flat payment and c is the marginal cost
of treatment. N is the exogenous number of patients the agency receives each period and
r specifies the fraction of patients that are recertified (and N (1 − r) would be the number
of patients that were discharged from the agency). At the most simple, N could be the
total number of patients divided by the number of agencies in the market, or an equal share
in the market. This can be changed to be a function of some marketing efforts or quality
investments that influences market share. Set up like this, one can see that quantity is
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defined by two parts: an extensive margin, N , which for the moment I fix as constant and
exogenous, and an endogenous intensive margin, r.
Thus the agency’s utility is a function of three components, Uj = U (π, N (1 − r), r), which
for simplicity are additively separable. I assume that π and Q have diminishing marginal
utilities and that r is increasing in marginal disutility.
In sum, we have:

Uj = U (π(Q), Q(r), r)
= U (mN (1 + r), N (1 + r), r)

with, letting the subscripts on utility represent the partial derivatives,

Uπ > 0, UQ > 0, Ur < 0
Uππ <= 0, UQQ <= 0, Urr <= 0
UπQ = UQr = Uπr = 0

The conditions for utility maximization with respect to r are:

FOC: Uπ mN + UQ N + Ur = 0

(A.1)

SOC: Uππ (mN )2 + UQQ (N )2 + Urr ≤ 0

We can verify that the second order condition is less than zero because Uππ , UQQ , and Urr
are all non-positive.
Fully differentiating and utilizing the fact that cross-partials are zero, I can find the change
in N on the change in r. For more recertification when N decreases, as it would with greater
competition, I expect that dr/dN to be negative.
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−Uππ (N m2 (1 + r)) − Uπ m − UQQ (1 + r)N − UQ
dr∗
=
dN
Uππ (mN )2 + UQQ (N )2 + Urr

(A.2)

As shown above, we know that the denominator is negative. For the numerator to be positive
(thus dr/dN is negative), it must be that the positive terms are greater than the negative
terms. Using the assumptions laid out earlier, the double partial terms (−Uππ (N m2 (1 +
r)) and −UQQ (1 + r)N ) are the positive terms and the single partial terms are negative
(−Uπ m, −UQ ). If it is the case that the agencies have a strong quantity effect, then UQQ
will be large and dominate the equation. This will sign dr∗ /dN as negative, where a fall in
N will lead to a rise in the rate of r.
However, if the agency does not have any utility for quantity, then UQ = UQQ = 0 and
the focus is on the maximization of utility due to profits. It may still be the case that
dr∗ /dN < 0 if the first term with Uππ is greater than the absolute value of the second term
with Uπ . This would be the case if the agency’s marginal utility for profits is in the part of
the curve where it falls rapidly. However, a perfectly profit-maximizing agency would likely
have a constant marginal utility for profits, making Uππ = 0. In this case, the negative term,
−Uπ m will be the only term in the numerator, unequivocally making dr∗ /dN positive. In
all cases, the effect is exacerbated when N is small and vice versa, approaches zero when
N is very big since it is squared in the denominator.
The predictions are summed up as follows:
1. If the home health agency maximizes both quantity and profits and its utility for
quantity (or, marginal disutility diminishes rapidly around r∗ ) is sufficiently large,
then a decline in N , which we assume occurs due to greater agency competition, leads
to a rise in r.
2. If the home health agency is a pure profit-maximizer, then a decline in N leads to a
drop in r.
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A.1.3. Exogenous HHI Calculation
The exogenous HHI calculation from the predicted probability P rhj of each patient from
hospital h from zipcode k choosing home health agency j located within 100 miles follows
Kessler and McClellan (2000), where,
euhj
P r(uhj = 1) = PJ
uhl
l=1 e

First, I multiply this predicted probability of a patient from hospital h attending agency j
from hospital zip k by the frequency weight of that zip code to get the total count from zip
k, njk and then divide it by the total count of patients attending any agency from zip k to
obtain the zip-specific market share of agency j, which I call α̂jk .
n̂jk
α̂jk = PJ
j=1 n̂jk

Then I create a zip-level HHI measure by taking the sum of the squares of each agency
j = {1, ..., J} k-level market share.

HHIk =

J
X

2
α̂jk

j=1

Then I take the average of all the zip-level HHI’s, weighted by the share of patients that
agency j sees from hospital zip k. This is very similar to the agency-specific weighted average
HHI I use in the base specifications, except rather than calculating it from actual patient
flows, I use exogenously-determined predicted patient flows. In both cases, this creates an
agency-specific HHI varying by the level of competitiveness of the various zip-codes the
agency serves and the share of patients from those zip-codes.

HHIj =

K
X

n̂jk
HHIk
PK
k=1 n̂jk
k=1
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The correlation between the exogenous HHI’s is decent, with the person-level correlation
being 0.66 and 0.69 and the facility-level correlation being 0.75 and 0.73 for the full US and
geographic separated regions respectively.
A.1.4. Variation between and within fixed effects
Table A.1 shows the variation between and within the various fixed effects used. The table
shows that overall 17.4% of people attend an integrated hospital and agency, ranging from
a minimum of 0% and a maximum of 1%. Between HRR’s, the standard deviation of
integration rate is 0.190, ranging from 0 to 0.913. Within an HRR, over time, the standard
deviation is 0.351. Between hospitals, the between variation increases to 0.315 and the
within change decreases to 0.249. Between hospital-agency pairs, the standard deviation is
the smallest at 0.087. Within a pair, the deviation from a pair’s average ranges from -.812
to 1.13. This average includes the global mean, which once subtracted out shows that the
within deviation ranges between -.986 and .956 (essentially, zero and one minus a few that
may change more than once in a period).
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Table A.1: Variation over time within and across fixed effects
(1)
Mean

(2)
Std. Dev

(3)
Min

(4)
Max

(5)
Observations

HRR Fixed Effects
Vert. Int. overall 0.174
between
within

0.379
0.190
0.351

0
0
-0.739

1
.913
1.173

N = 5907691
n = 306
T-bar = 19306.2

Hospital Fixed Effects
Vert. Int. overall 0.174
between
within

0.379
0.315
0.249

0
0
-0.819

1
1
1.172

N = 5907691
n = 4534
T-bar = 1302.98

Hospital-HHA Pair Fixed Effects
Vert. Int. overall 0.174
0.379
between
0.087
within
0.078

0
0
-0.812

1
1
1.132

N = 5907691
n = 163829
T-bar = 36.06

This table shows the variation between and within the various fixed effects used. The table shows
that overall 17.4% of people attend an integrated hospital and agency, ranging from a minimum
of 0% and a maximum of 1%. Between HRR’s, the standard deviation of integration rate is 0.190,
ranging from 0 to 0.913. Within an HRR, over time, there is only a standard deviation of 0.351.
Between hospitals, the between variation increases to 0.315 and the within change decreases to
0.249. Between hospital-agency pairs, the standard deviation is the smallest at 0.087. Within a
pair, the deviation from a pair’s average ranges from -.812 to 1.13, centered around 0.078.
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A.1.5. Additional specifications of competition
I attempted two other methods to create exogenous variation in agency competition that I
could use to proxy or instrument for competition. First, I used certificate of need (CON)
laws to derive variation. By including HRR fixed effects, I could effectively compare areas
that were subject to CON laws to areas without CON laws but were similar enough to be
included in the same HRR. However, the results were not high-powered enough; the first
stage F-statistic is only 7.96 which means the CON laws are a weak instrument and we
cannot use the results reliably (Table A.3).
The second method I considered was agency brand fixed effects. During the time period
in the sample, I looked up several acquisitions by some of the biggest HHA players and
coded this into the dataset, identifying which HHAs were part of these brands. The brands
include Gentiva, Amedisys, Kindred, Bayada, Interim, Encompass. Other big players–LHC
group, Almost Family–do not have brand names on their facilities, making it very difficult
to find all of the facilities owned by these brands in the dataset. They did have mergers
but I left them out of the sample due to the inability to find the set of facilities owned.
None of these specifications led to any conclusive evidence and the estimates were far from
the main estimates, leading me to believe that the population sample (only 250,000 N) was
not representative of the national whole and there was not enough power behind the sample
to lead to any useful specification (Table A.2). One thing that it may also be informing
us is that national brands may act differently than smaller, independent groups. However,
this must be taken with a grain of salt as many brands were not identified in the dataset
and this is not close to a full picture.
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Table A.2: Effect of HHA Concentration on Any Recertification: Using Brand FE’s

HH Agency HHI

(1)
Base
b/se
0.0134
(0.075)

(2)
OLS
b/se
-0.0846
(0.051)

Exog HHI

(3)
Base
b/se

(4)
OLS
b/se

0.1336∗
(0.053)

0.0178
(0.037)

Exog HHI (Geo)
Patient Cntrl
Hosp & HHA Ctrl
Market Ctrl
Brand FE
N
r2 a

No
No
No
Yes
256005
0.0018

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
255898
0.1257

No
No
No
Yes
256005
0.0013

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
255898
0.1250

(5)
Base
b/se

(6)
OLS
b/se

0.0526
(0.027)
No
No
No
Yes
256005
0.0006

-0.0180
(0.024)
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
255898
0.1250

All regressions are robust se, clustered at brand.
Brands used: Amedisys, Gentiva, Bayada, Encompass, Interim.

Table A.3: Effect of HHA Concentration on Any Recertification: Cross-state CON laws
with FE

HH Agency HHI

(1)
Base
b/se
-0.2164∗∗∗
(0.032)

(2)
OLS
b/se
-0.0845∗∗∗
(0.017)

X-State CON laws
Patient Cntrl
Hosp & HHA Ctrl
Market Ctrl
N
r2 adj.
F

No
No
No
5846992

Yes
Yes
Yes
5838926

(3)
FS
b/se

0.0684∗∗
(0.024)
Yes
Yes
Yes
5846992
0.0018

(4)
IV
b/se
-0.9906
(0.927)

Yes
Yes
Yes
730388
0.1072
7.96

All regressions are robust se, clustered at HRR (Hospital Referral Region) and fixed effects at
HRR level. The Instrumental Variable (IV) is the presence of a HHA Certificate of Need law in a
state. With HRR FE’s, this makes use of HRR’s that encompass multiple states and the defining
variation comes from states with CON laws and states without CON laws in the same HRR.
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A.2. Tables
A.2.1. Estimates from main specifications excluding outliers
Table B.4: Estimates from Main Specifications for Sample without Outlier Patients

Vert. Int.
Agency HHI (Exog.)
N
r2 adj.

VI-focused Regressions
(1)
(2)
(3)
HRR OLS HRR IV
Pair FE
b/se
b/se
b/se
∗∗∗
∗∗∗
-0.0432
-0.0327
-0.0395∗∗∗
(0.003)
(0.009)
(0.006)
5805782
0.1261

5805777
0.1333

5805782
0.0978

HHI-focused
(4)
(5)
No FE
HSA FE
b/se
b/se

-0.0721∗∗∗
5804550
0.1616

-0.0508∗∗∗
5804550
0.1252

All regressions, estimated following equation 2.1, are robust SE, clustered at HRR (hospital referral
region). Fixed effects (FE) are given by column headers, where HRR is a hospital referral region
and HSA is a hospital service area. The dependent variable is any recertification (0/1 dummy).The
instrument used in (2) is differential distance, or the distance from patient zip centroid to nearest
vertically integrated hospital minus distance to nearest non-integrated hospital. Patient controls include
demographics, comorbidities, risk factors; hospital and HHA controls include profit status, teaching
status, bed size, and rural/urban; and market-level (percent over age 65, number of long term care beds,
hospital and agency concentration, and skilled nursing facility concentration) controls are included.
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A.2.2. Alternative specification results
Table B.5: Vertical Integration and HHI on Recertification: Probit and LPM results

Vert. Int.
Agency HHI (Wt. Avg.)

(1)
LPM
b/se
-0.0418∗∗∗
(0.004)
-0.1539∗∗∗
(0.021)

(2)
LPM
b/se
-0.0454∗∗∗
(0.004)

(4)
Probit
b/se
-0.0468∗∗∗
(0.004)
-0.1541∗∗∗
(0.021)

-0.0799∗∗∗
(0.017)

Agency HHI (Exog.)
Agency HHI (Regional)
N
r2 adj.

(3)
LPM
b/se
-0.0444∗∗∗
(0.004)

1177092
0.1663

1177092
0.1638

(5)
Probit
b/se
-0.0512∗∗∗
(0.005)

(6)
Probit
b/se
-0.0500∗∗∗
(0.004)

-0.0801∗∗∗
(0.018)
-0.1182∗∗∗
(0.016)
1177092
0.1649

1153297

1153297

-0.1246∗∗∗
(0.018)
1153297

This regression is run at a random 20% sample to reduce computational complexity. No fixed effects are
included here due to incidental parameters issue, but all specifications are robust SE, clustered at HRR
(hospital referral region). The dependent variable is any recertification (0/1). Vert. Int. represents patients
receiving care at vertically integrated systems. Patient (demographics, comorbidities, risk factors), hospital,
agency (profit, urban, size, teaching), and market (percent over age 65, number of long term care beds,
hospital concentration) controls are included.
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Table B.6: Vertical Integration effect on Recertifications (True Count)
Zero-inflated negative binomial
(1)
(2)
(3)
Base
Pt. Ctrls.
All
b/se
b/se
b/se
main
Vert. Int.

0.5844∗∗∗
(0.030)

0.7303∗∗∗
(0.027)

0.7412∗∗∗
(0.024)
0.5894∗∗∗
(0.094)

3.2801∗∗∗
(0.363)

1.4538∗∗∗
(0.063)

No
No
1182782

Yes
No
1182782

1.4422∗∗∗
(0.059)
1.7047∗∗∗
(0.248)
Yes
Yes
1182782

Agency HHI (Exog.)
inflate
Vert. Int.
Agency HHI (Exog.)
Patient Ctrls
Provider Ctrls
N

Poisson with Fixed Effects
(4)
(5)
(6)
Base
Pt. Ctrls.
All
b/se
b/se
b/se
0.5384∗∗∗
(0.026)

0.6351∗∗∗
(0.026)

0.6217∗∗∗
(0.026)
0.8040∗
(0.074)

No
No
1182782

Yes
No
1182782

Yes
Yes
1182782

This regression is run at a random 20% sample to reduce computational complexity. The dependent variable
is number of recertifications, and the ‘inflate’ stage is on Vertical Integration (0/1 dummy) for the zeroinflated negative binomial (1)-(3). Results are reported as Incidence Rate Ratios (IRR). Base specifications
(1) and (4) have no controls beyond year controls; specs. (2) and (5) includes patient level controls such
as demographics, comorbidities, and risk factors; and (3) and (6) includes provider level and market level
controls.
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Table B.7: Vertical Integration effect on Spending: OLS vs GLM

Vert. Int.
Agency HHI (Exog.)
N
r2 adj.

(1)
Inpt (OLS)
b/se
-478.6634∗∗∗
(138.943)
590.8889
(521.633)
1055984
0.1275

(2)
Inpt (GLM)
b/se
-453.0789∗∗∗
(29.345)
674.6058∗∗∗
(61.663)
1055984

(3)
HHA (OLS)
b/se
-394.5432∗∗∗
(31.885)
-1316.5183∗∗∗
(147.693)
1063114
0.2255

(4)
HHA (GLM)
b/se
-431.9912∗∗∗
(7.067)
-1260.6547∗∗∗
(21.955)
1063114

(5)
Total (OLS)
b/se
-887.4466∗∗∗
(164.940)
-1258.8355
(655.827)
1058945
0.1251

All regressions are robust se, clustered at HRR (hospital referral region) level run at a 20% sample. (OLS)
specifications are ordinary least squares, (GLM) are run with log-link and gamma family with results reported
as margins. The dependent variable is spending at the column header level: Inpatient (Inpt) is index
admission cost, HHA is the total HHA cost including recertifications, and Total is inpatient plus HHA plus
any readmission costs. Patient controls include demographics, comorbidities, risk factors; hospital and HHA
controls include profit status, teaching status, bed size, and rural/urban; and market controls include percent
of market over age 65, number of long term care beds, and hospital concentration index.
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(6)
Total (GLM)
b/se
-963.7509∗∗∗
(36.836)
-1037.7513∗∗∗
(81.432)
1058945

Table B.8: Effect of Vertical Integration and Competition on Readmissions (60 and 90-Day)
Vertical Integration Specifications
(1)
(2)
HRR FE HRR IV
b/se
b/se
60-day Readmissions (mean: 0.25)
Vert. Int.
0.0007
-0.0052
(0.001)
(0.004)
r2 adj.
0.0594
0.0593

(3)
Hospital FE
b/se

(4)
Pair FE
b/se

(5)
HHA FE
b/se

0.0000
(0.001)
0.0557

-0.0008
(0.002)
0.0521

0.0015
(0.001)
0.0566

-0.0009
(0.001)
0.0648
5865542

0.0002
(0.003)
0.0603
5865542

0.0020
(0.001)
0.0658
5865542

(3)
HSA FE
b/se

(4)
HSA FE
b/se

90-day Readmissions (mean: 0.30)
Vert. Int.
0.0007
-0.0045
(0.001)
(0.005)
r2 adj.
0.0693
0.0692
N
5865542
5865537
Fstat
385.05

Competition Specifications
(1)
(2)
No FE
No FE
b/se
b/se
60-day Readmissions (mean: 0.25)
HH Agency HHI -0.0034
(0.007)
HHI Exog
-0.0412∗∗∗
(0.007)
r2 adj.
0.0613
0.0615
90-day Readmissions (mean: 0.30)
HH Agency HHI -0.0030
(0.008)
HHI Exog
-0.0505∗∗∗
(0.008)
N
5865542
5865542
r2 adj.
0.0717
0.0719

-0.0228∗∗∗
(0.006)

0.0594

-0.0132∗
(0.005)
0.0594

-0.0266∗∗∗
(0.007)

5865542
0.0693

-0.0150∗
(0.006)
5865542
0.0693

All regressions are robust SE, clustered at HRR (hospital referral region) except the HSA (hospital
service area) FE specifications which have HSA clusters, and include patients with the top 300 DRGs
(approximately 90% of the sample). Fixed effects (FE) are given by column headers. The dependent
variable is indicated in the sub-headers. Vert. Int. represents patients receiving care at vertically
integrated systems. Patient (demographics, comorbidities, risk factors), hospital, agency (profit, urban,
size, teaching), and market (percent over age 65, number of long term care beds, hospital and agency
concentration, and skilled nursing facility concentration) controls are included.
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Table B.9: Effect of Recertifications on Spending & Readmissions: Pair FE’s or Diff. Distance as IV
Pair FE
(1)
(2)
OLS (VI) OLS (Recert)
b/se
b/se
Log Inpatient Spending (mean: $10,500)
Vert. Int.
0.0080
(0.005)
Any Recert.
0.0134∗∗∗
(0.001)
2
r adj.
0.7821
0.7821
Log Total HHA Spending (mean: $3,500)
Vert. Int.
-0.0506∗∗∗
(0.011)
Any Recert.
1.1406∗∗∗
(0.008)
2
r adj.
0.1967
0.3710
30-Day Readmissions (mean: 0.17)
Vert. Int.
0.0001
(0.002)
Any Recert.
0.0365∗∗∗
(0.005)
r2 adj.
0.0492
0.0501
N
5339919
5339919
First Stage
F-stat

(3)
2SLS (Recert)
b/se

Diff. Dist. as IV
(4)
(5)
OLS (Recert) 2SLS (Recert)
b/se
b/se

-0.1969
(0.115)
-0.0217

0.0166∗∗∗
(0.001)
0.1508

1.0213∗∗
(0.363)
0.5504

1.2474∗∗∗
(0.194)
0.3435

1.1552∗∗∗
(0.009)
0.4011

1.5099∗∗∗
(0.349)
0.3843

-0.0037
(0.049)
-0.0024
5339919
-0.0405∗∗∗
(0.007)
34.63

0.0324∗∗∗
(0.005)
0.0563
5339915

0.1837
(0.110)
0.0391
5281599
0.0004∗∗
(0.000)
9.75

All regressions are robust SE, clustered at HRR (hospital referral region). Columns (1)-(3) are HospitalAgency Pair FE’s and (4)-(5) are HRR FE’s. Sample consists of patients with the top 300 DRGs
(approximately 90% of the sample). The dependent variable is indicated in the sub-headers. Inpatient
spending is the dollars spent for the index admission, total home health spending equals dollars spent
for all connected home health episodes following an inpatient stay. Vert. Int. represents patients
receiving care at vertically integrated systems. Vertical Integration is used as the instrument for Any
Recertification (0/1 dummy) in (3), and differential distance to nearest VI hospital from patient’s
zip code is the instrument used in (5). Patient (demographics, comorbidities, risk factors), hospital,
agency (profit, urban, size, teaching), and market (percent over age 65, number of long term care beds,
concentration levels of hospitals, agency and SNF) controls are included.
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Table B.10: Effect of Recertifications on Spending & Readmissions using IV analysis (Recerts ≤ 1)
Pair FE (VI)
(1)
(2)
(3)
OLS (VI) OLS (Recert) 2SLS (Recert)
b/se
b/se
b/se
Log Inpatient Spending (mean: $10,500)
Vert. Int.
0.0076
(0.005)
Agency HHI (Exog.)
Any Recert.
r2 adj.

0.7937

0.0132∗∗∗
(0.001)
0.7937

-0.3239
(0.214)
-0.0811

Log Total HHA Spending (mean: $3,500)
Vert. Int.
-0.0190∗
(0.009)
Agency HHI (Exog.)
Any Recert.
r2 adj.

0.1997

0.8779∗∗∗
(0.003)
0.2905

r2 adj.
N
First Stage
F-stat

0.0499
5339919

0.0089
(0.021)

0.7971

0.0156∗∗∗
(0.001)
0.7972

-0.2987
(0.724)
0.0018

0.8782∗∗∗
(0.002)
0.3046

1.3375
(0.761)
0.2543

0.0519∗∗∗
(0.003)
0.0584
5339919

0.1309
(0.193)
0.0156
5339919
-0.0500∗∗∗
(0.015)
11.03

-0.0410
(0.024)
0.8069∗
(0.329)
0.2535

30-Day Readmissions (mean: 0.17)
Vert. Int.
-0.0005
(0.002)
Agency HHI (Exog.)
Any Recert.

Agency HHI (Exog.) as IV
(4)
(5)
(6)
OLS (HHI) OLS (Recert) 2SLS (Recert)
b/se
b/se
b/se

0.2141

-0.0040
(0.006)
0.0549∗∗∗
(0.005)
0.0516
5339919

0.0198
(0.101)
-0.0014
5339919
-0.0405∗∗∗
(0.007)
24.42

0.0569
5339919

All regressions are robust SE, clustered at HRR (hospital referral region). Estimates are run following
specifications found in Section 3.3. Columns (1)-(3) are Hospital-Agency Pair FE’s and (4)-(5) are
HRR FE’s. Sample consists of patients with the top 300 DRGs (approximately 90% of the sample).
The dependent variable is indicated in the sub-headers. Inpatient spending is the dollars spent for
the index admission, total home health spending equals dollars spent for all connected home health
episodes following an inpatient stay. Vert. Int. represents patients receiving care at vertically integrated
systems. Vertical Integration is used as the instrument for Any Recertification (0/1 dummy) in (3),
and differential distance to nearest VI hospital from patient’s zip code is the instrument used in (5).
Patient (demographics, comorbidities, risk factors), hospital, agency (profit, urban, size, teaching), and
market (percent over age 65, number of long term care beds, concentration levels of hospitals, agency
and SNF) controls are included.
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Table B.11: Percent of Medicare Advantage patients in Agency
(1)
(2)
All
<P25
Percent of MA patients seen in the Agency
%MA agency
0.129
0.00564
(0.145) (0.00611)
Agency HHI (Wt. Avg)
0.276
0.187
(0.165)
(0.151)
Agency HHI (Exog)
0.157
0.0905
(0.157)
(0.132)
Agency HHI (Regional Exog) 0.144
0.0800
(0.150)
(0.116)
Recert rate
0.238
0.324
(0.220)
(0.282)
Observations
188130
47033

(3)
P25-P50

(4)
P50-P75

(5)
≥P75

0.0479
(0.0176)
0.302
(0.175)
0.192
(0.178)
0.168
(0.171)
0.254
(0.214)
47030

0.128
(0.0298)
0.316
(0.156)
0.191
(0.158)
0.178
(0.157)
0.209
(0.176)
47040

0.333
(0.139)
0.299
(0.142)
0.153
(0.135)
0.150
(0.130)
0.164
(0.151)
47027

Percent of MA patients using Home Health in HSA
HSA MA%
0.149
0.0811
0.109
(0.129) (0.0983) (0.0762)
Agency HHI (Wt. Avg)
0.276
0.226
0.312
(0.165)
(0.170)
(0.163)
Agency HHI (Exog)
0.157
0.125
0.193
(0.157)
(0.160)
(0.161)
Agency HHI (Regional Exog) 0.144
0.109
0.174
(0.150)
(0.146)
(0.157)
Recert rate
0.238
0.300
0.234
(0.220)
(0.263)
(0.199)
Observations
188134
73548
38148

0.164
(0.0767)
0.318
(0.154)
0.191
(0.161)
0.181
(0.160)
0.203
(0.168)
35190

0.293
(0.134)
0.297
(0.141)
0.150
(0.131)
0.147
(0.127)
0.160
(0.149)
41248

Medicare Advantage Overall penetration (percentage)
MA penetration
0.212
0.186
0.187
(0.137)
(0.138)
(0.102)
Agency HHI (Wt. Avg)
0.276
0.251
0.318
(0.165)
(0.173)
(0.154)
Agency HHI (Exog)
0.156
0.146
0.192
(0.157)
(0.163)
(0.161)
Agency HHI (Regional Exog) 0.144
0.128
0.183
(0.150)
(0.152)
(0.162)
Recert rate
0.238
0.282
0.204
(0.220)
(0.248)
(0.171)
Observations
187942
105663
34040

0.248
(0.114)
0.306
(0.144)
0.166
(0.138)
0.165
(0.133)
0.176
(0.155)
26170

0.333
(0.132)
0.291
(0.140)
0.138
(0.128)
0.133
(0.125)
0.151
(0.145)
22069

This table shows person-level characteristics from the dataset. The columns (2-5) are increasing
quartiles of Medicare Advantage (MA) penetration (from first quartile to fourth quartile),
under three definitions: A. The percent of MA patients seen in the HHA of all Medicare
patients, B. Percent of patients among all Medicare users of home health in the HSA, and
C. percent of MA patients enrolled by county. Medicare Advantage data was only obtained
for 2010-2013. Agency HHI (Wt. Avg) is the agency-specific weighted average of zip-level
HHI’s. (Exog) is the predicted HHI estimated through conditional logit model of patient flow,
and (Regional Exog) allows for greater geographic flexibility for the taste parameters using 10
separate models grouped by geographic area. See section 2.2.2 for more details.
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